An Investigation of Semantic Invariance in Human Speech by Tarr, David Burton
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects
5-1-1983
An Investigation of Semantic Invariance in Human
Speech
David Burton Tarr
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tarr, David Burton, "An Investigation of Semantic Invariance in Human Speech" (1983). Theses and Dissertations. 1213.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/1213
AN INVESTIGATION OF SEMANTIC 
INVARIANCE IN HUMAN SPEECH
by
David Burton Tarr
Bachelor of Arts, Yale University, 1967 
Master of Divinity, Yale University Divinity School, 1971 
Master of Arts, New School for Social Research, 1975 
Master of Arts, University of North Dakota, 1980
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Grand Forks, North Dakota
May
1983

This dissertation submitted by David Burton Tarr in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty 
Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.
This dissertation meets the standards for appearance and conforms 
to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the 
University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.
Dean of the Graduate School
Permission
Title AN INVESTIGATION OF SEMANTIC INVARIANCE IN HUMAN SPEECH
Department Psychology__________________________________________
Degree______Doctor of Philosophy________________________________
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of 
North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that 
permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be 
granted by the professor who supervised my dissertation work or, 
in his absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of 
the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or 
publication or other use of this dissertation or part thereof 
for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall 
be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any 
scholarly use which may be made of any material in my disser­
tation.
Signature
Date
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES.................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................ vi
ABSTRACT.......................................................... vii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ........................................  1
CHAPTER II. M E T H O D ..........................................  61
CHAPTER III. R E S U L T S .......................................... 70
CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION ........................................  79
CHAPTER V. S U MMARY..........................................  88
APPENDICES...................................................... 90
APPENDIX A. MOONEY FACES BOOKLET ..........................  91
APPENDIX B. MOONEY FACES ANSWER SHEET ....................  98
APPENDIX C. EKMAN FACES BOOKLET ..........................  101
APPENDIX D. EKMAN FACES ANSWER SHEET ......................  117
APPENDIX E. EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE ......................  122
APPENDIX F. INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS ......................  129
APPENDIX G. LIST OF STIMULUS ITEMS........................... 131
REFERENCES........................................................ 133
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Correlations Among MBTI, Mooney, Ekman and Mehrabian
Variables................................................ 71
2a. Correlations Between Selected Variables and Phonetic
Symbol Scores Using Inclusion Criterion of > +1 S.D. or 
< -1 S.D. on the MBTI (N = 24) ..........................  73
2b. Correlations Between Selected Variables and Phonetic
Symbol Scores Using Inclusion Criterion of > +1.75 S.D.
or < -1.75 S.D. on the MBTI (N = 15) ....................  74
3a. Intercorrelations and Significance Levels of Phonetic
Symbol Scores Using Inclusion Criterion of > +1 S.D. or 
< -1 S.D. on the MBTI (N = 24) ..........................  75
3b. Intercorrelations and Significance Levels of Phonetic
Symbol Scores Using Inclusion Criterion of > +1.75 S.D.
or < -1.75 S.D. on the MBTI (N = 15) ....................  75
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express deep appreciation to my chairman,
Dr. James A. Clark, for the support and guidance he has provided in 
the planning and execution of this dissertation project. He and my 
committee members, Drs. Kweit, Tabor, Tucker and Tyler, have labored 
diligently under severe time pressure to meet deadlines and satisfy 
schedule requirements for my graduation. This has been most gratifying.
In the data gathering phase of this dissertation I received help 
from several people connected with the UND Psychology Department. These 
included James Penland, who gave generous technical assistance in 
setting up my apparatus, and Psychology 101 instructors and section 
leaders, who permitted me to do initial screening of subjects during 
class time. These were essential elements in completion of the project.
My family deserves special mention for the role they have played in 
helping me to realize the dream of becoming a professional psychologist. 
My dear wife, Helen, has moved half the way across the continent and 
has endured six years of economic privation because she felt this goal 
was worthwhile. In addition, she assisted in the many tedious chores 
associated with this dissertation— phoning subjects, scoring Rorschach 
protocols, etc. One cannot hope for a greater demonstration of love.
My children, Megan and Susan, are to be thanked for providing diversion 
from the drudgery of writing. Thanks are also due my parents who have 
been very supportive at key junctures in the entire process.
vi
ABSTRACT
The present investigation addresses the hypothesis of phonetic 
symbolism, or phonetic universals, in human speech. As a philosophical 
question, this theoretical notion can be seen as an offshoot of intel­
lectual idealism; the latter school of thought holds that structural 
invariance is to be found in human cognition. As a psycholinguistic 
and epistemological concept, the phonetic symbol is understood to be a 
structural a priori in sound which correlates with the semantic 
properties of physiognomic, muscular tension. An extension of this 
hypothesis is the assumption that phonemes without conventional meaning 
in a language can approximate semantic equivalence of ordinary words 
under appropriate experimental conditions. This phenomenon has been 
documented in the work of several investigators (Kohler 1927; Iritani 
1962; Langer and Rosenberg 1966). For example, Langer and Rosenberg 
(1964) developed a set of normed color phonetic symbols capable of 
evoking color meanings in widely divergent populations. These color 
phonetic symbols were adopted for target stimulus items in the present 
study.
This dissertation attempts to explore the psychodynamic parameter- 
of phonetic symbol access. Specifically, it makes use of a variety of 
clinical and cognitive/experimental tools to tap instinctual processes 
which could conceivably contribute to phonetic symbol access. It was 
reasoned that the phonetic symbol should represent a semantic unit
vii
embedded deep in the evolutionary history of human language. Conse­
quently, it was thought that persons who are most in touch with the 
instinctual residues of the distant past (i.e., the unconscious) would 
also have ready addess to phonetic/semantic a priori.
In order to select subjects with differing propensity for instinc­
tual thought, two widely accepted clinical instruments were employed. 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator was used to identify persons on the 
extremes of the attribute of intuition; Jungian psychology holds that 
high intuition is synonymous with access to unconscious and instinctual 
processes. The Rorschach Inkblot Test has been adapted by Holt (1970) 
to differentiate the Freudian constructs of primary and secondary 
process thought; further, Holt's scoring system attempts to distinguish 
mature, creative primary process from disorganized primary process.
The present study predicted a high correlation between easy access to 
instinctual contents (intuition, adaptive primary process) and skill in 
decoding phonetic symbols.
Other experimental manipulations included examinations of the 
influence of cerebral laterality and interpersonal sensitivity on 
phonetic symbol skill. It was hypothesized that phonetic symbolism 
would correlate positively with right cerebral hemisphere processing 
and high interpersonal sensitivity.
With the exception of the hypothesis concerning interpersonal 
sensitivity, none of the experimental hypotheses was supported. None­
theless, trend level significance was noted in correlations involving 
several of the Rorschach indices. An unexpected correlation between 
female gender and phonetic symbol access was found; this was discussed
viii
in the context of previous findings demonstrating superior female verbal 
ability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Two radically different approaches to human understanding can be 
seen as streams issuing from classical Greece and stimulating intellec­
tual expression in Europe and the United States from the seventeenth 
century until the present time. The first approach is that formulated 
by Plato, and it maintains that human apprehension of truth can occur 
independent of sense experience through a process of recollection of 
innate ideas. A corollary to this assertion is the doctrine which 
holds that objects encountered in the world are mere reflections of 
preexisting ideal concepts of these objects. The second approach is 
that associated with Aristotle, and it contradicts the Platonic notion 
of transcendent, or innate, ideas. Rather, it holds that existent, 
immediate forms are no less real than the general concepts which they 
represent. Consequently, human knowledge is seen as advancing through 
the exercise of sense perception in the present time. Refinements of 
knowledge can occur over time as a person learns to make discriminations 
between objects across sense modalities. Hence, the Platonic approach 
can be described as ideal, introspective, reductionistic, abstract and 
mathematical; whereas, Aristotelian method is to be seen as realistic, 
investigative, taxonomic, concrete and empirical. The former approach 
presumes a unity among the sciences, and the latter insists on inde­
pendence of the various sciences (Russell 1945; O'Connor 1964a).
1
2It proves useful conceptually to distinguish between Platonic and 
Aristotelian theories of knowledge, since much controversy across 
academic disciplines has resulted from this very basic difference in 
epistemology. Of particular interest here is the way in which this 
dichotomy is manifest in the domains of: 1) philosophical theory of 
knowledge, 2) psychological theory of knowledge, and 3) in linguistic 
theory. In an effort to illustrate these differences in approach within 
modern intellectual history, a sampling of authors from these three 
areas is presented below. No attempt is made to provide an exhaustive 
treatment of each contributor. Rather, the sketch below is intended to 
offer an appreciation of the evolution of debate within and across 
disciplines.
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Empiricist Conceptions
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), one of the earlier British empiricists, 
promulgated a materialistic theory of knowledge which maintained that 
all thought results from human sensing of motion in the external world. 
He questioned the worth of religious belief, stating that "man can have 
no thought of anything not subject to sense."
For Hobbes the principal use of language was as a means of clas­
sification through the assignment of names. Names were seen as 
arbitrarily chosen to serve as "marks" for referents in the environment. 
Hobbes insisted that all speech meet the requirement of performing a 
classificatory, or naming, function; any speech not meeting this test 
was relegated to the class of nonsense speech or mere sound. Hobbes 
justified this stricture by describing the vital role of language in
3building abstract reasoning. He used the analogy of geometry, which 
also starts with units of arbitrarily assigned meaning (i.e., axioms) 
and which then creates more elaborate theorems and proofs. Hobbes 
presaged associationist doctrine by thus demonstrating the linkage of 
simple language, to more complex and contingent language and thought 
(Flew 1964a).
Associationist principles matured in the writings of empiricist 
John Locke (1632-1704). Locke believed that all human knowledge derived 
from experience either from direct linkage with the esternal world 
through the senses or from our own mental life through introspection.
In Lockean theory the process of association permits an idea, A, to 
become a sign for an event or mental content, B. As signs, ideas were 
thought to represent to the mind whatever the person might be thinking 
of; ideas were thought capable of carrying a variety of meanings, such 
as immediate objects, sensory events, images, abstract ideas, etc. In 
this system, words were seen as second derivatives of ideas and there­
fore capable of existing only in association with these ideas; whereas, 
ideas were seen as having existence independent of language. Using a 
commercial metaphor, Locke maintained that language is meaningful to 
the extent that it is backed by ideas in the same way that currency is 
valuable to the extent it is backed by goods.
Locke dismissed the possibility of ideas being innate using both 
strong and weak sources of evidence. In answer to arguments favoring 
the innate goodness of man he replied that our living experience strongly 
contradicts any assertion of natural, untaught virtue. Locke's approach 
was more conservative in response to those suggesting the growth of 
thought and idea in human embryo. He essentially invoked Occam's razor
4stating that "we have no evidence that a truth is in the mind other than 
it is understood"; in other words, innate ideas are not subject to 
introspective observation.
The chief dilemma which confronted Locke was his need to explain 
how knowledge advances without resorting to nativist conceptions or 
imputing unrealistic properties to human consciousness. A note of 
frustration is seen in Locke's attempt to explain how the blank slate 
of mind is filled; ultimately, he challenged the reader to "examine his 
own thoughts and report whether all the original ideas are any other 
than of objects of his senses or of the operations of his mind consid­
ered as objects of his reflection." Essentially, in so writing, he 
posed a two part method of cognition: sensation was the primary and 
immediate means of receiving external stimuli; reflection was the 
secondary mental activity involving interpretation and introspection. 
Complex mental activities such as thinking, doubting, believing, reason­
ing and willing were understood to be the products of reflection; also, 
it was through reflection that the simple ideas generated by sensation 
were associated with one another to form complex and abstract ideas 
(O'Connor 1964b).
David Hume (1711-1776) developed a two part schematic of cognition 
similar to that of Locke but which distinguished between two forms of 
immediate sensory experience. An impression was Hume's concept of a 
strong, initial sensory experience involving a sensation, passion or 
emotion as it makes its first "appearance on our soul." An idea was a 
weak perception derived from an impression and which influenced 
thinking and reasoning. The fundamental difference between an impres­
sion and an idea was simply that of strength. Hume used the evidence
5of persons with defective sense (e.g., blind or deaf from birth) to 
demonstrate that ideas and thoughts are possible only for perceptions 
seen or felt in the individual's own mind.
In a discussion of instinct Hume made the point that learning from 
experience is a very primitive capacity. He cited examples of "igno­
rant and stupid peasants, . . . infants, even brute beasts" being able 
to learn yet unable to show any insight or predictive control over 
future events. In this sense, he included man as wholly part of animal 
nature rather than a being uniquely set apart for its capacity of 
reason. A notion of evolution is suggested in Hume's concept of 
custom, which was used to show how repeated experience of an instinctual 
sort might become consolidated in the ordinary person's mind. However, 
such automatic inferences or memories of experience were distinguished 
from reason.
The possibility of reason or abstract thought was understood to 
occur only through the use of philosophy. Hume believed that philoso­
phy's strength was its inherent skepticism which gives awareness of the 
imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Ordinary men 
were seen as carried along by natural instinct and capable of only 
intermittent self awareness. Hume argued that the application of very 
elementary philosophy teaches one that "the table which we see seems 
to diminish as we remove further from it, while the real table, which 
exists independent of us, suffers no alteration." In other words, 
philosophy shows that mental perceptions cannot be identified with 
external things (Flew 1964b).
6Rationalist Conceptions
The rationalist position of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) gave con­
siderable credit to human capacity to initiate thought and appreciate 
the limitations of perception. His famous credo, cogito, ergo sum, 
carried a clear affirmation of belief in the power of human understand­
ing. Implicit in the statement, "I think," is the Cartesian notion of 
mind as wholly other, intangible and possessing qualities separate 
from that of body. Mind was seen as being informed by the senses but 
at the same time totally apart from them. To demonstrate the compre­
hensive nature of mind versus the inherent limitations of sense, 
Descartes employed the example of the ball of wax. Whereas each sense 
individually will lead to error in describing only one dimension of the 
wax (i.e., its hardness, color, shape, odor, etc.), the mind is able to 
perceive its many qualities simultaneously and will also know that it 
is the same wax when it is melted and assumes a new shape. The 
limitations of the individual senses were thought by Descartes to 
provide clear evidence that mind and body were coexistent only to the 
extent that mind might receive mechanical signals from body to assist 
it in decision making.
For Descartes, mathematics provided the working model for testing 
the validity of one's deductions about reality. He held that non- 
empirical scientific advancement occurs when one uses logic to carry 
out assumptions that are simple and obvious until one arrives at 
conclusions that are neither simple nor obvious.
Deduction and intuition were seen as working hand-in-hand in the 
service of achieving understanding. In Descartes' system intuition was 
not an inspirational event but was rather a basic, well disciplined
7method of determining whether an inferential step in an argument was 
valid. Deduction was seen as a process dependent upon intuition and 
having the same goal as intuition, namely determination of the truth or 
falsity of a proposition. Yet deduction was thought to be less direct 
than intuition, in that it might be accomplished by gaining understand­
ing of propositions which are extensions of a first proposition; in 
this instance, perfect understanding of the first proposition may not 
be necessary.
By introducing a mathematically based theory of understanding into 
philosophical discourse, Descartes hoped to achieve absolute rigor in 
describing human cognition. Through a technique which he called the 
Method of Doubt, Descartes amplified the rigor of discourse by requiring 
himself to discard any assumption he could conceivably disbelieve.
Only those assumptions meeting this test were included in a set of 
fundamental assumptions. It was this exhaustive examination of intel­
lectual propositions and assumptions that gave Descartes the confidence 
to state "whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true" 
(Watling 1964).
Gottfried von Leibniz (1646-1716) shared Descartes' confidence 
that all problems of knowledge are susceptible to mathematical analysis. 
Leibniz foresaw a time when human conflict would be resolved through 
the use of mathematical calculation.
In Leibniz's philosophical system, calculation was employed to 
elucidate the relationships among primary "real beings" which he called 
monads. The monad was Leibniz's attempt to counter atomistic 
tendencies in empiricist theories of reality. These empiricist notions 
typically maintained that all things consisted of elementary particles
8in a constant state of flux and that these particles existed in an 
interdependent relationship. By contrast, a monad was conceived by 
Leibniz to be a simple substance without parts which resists impact or 
penetration from other monads; it was seen as existing in immutable 
form and as supplying its own energy for activity.
The monad was primarily a cognitive entity whose function was 
perception, thought or consciousness. Consequently, the soul was seen 
to be the dominant monad which is capable of governing the monad of 
body through the exercise of will. Monadology also reflected itself in 
human language, such that the exclusiveness of names was seen as an 
ideal, "one name, one thing." Moreover, language in Leibniz's system 
was viewed as the analog for relationships between objects and persons 
in the real world. He believed that the way that names are put 
together shows the way that things are put together. Therefore, propo­
sitions were thought to portray meaning by picturing facts.
A devout Christian, Leibniz believed that God, in his perfect 
knowledge, could read from the true names of individuals all that is 
true of them, past, present and future. This represented the complete­
ness of the monad of the name and its perfect correlation with the true 
nature of the person named (Saw 1964).
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) shared in the idealistic climate that 
inspired Leibniz's monadology. There is a Platonic remnant in Kant's 
explanation of sensation. Noumena, or things-in-themselves, were seen 
as general ideal objects which impact on the senses. This was con­
trasted with the specific instance of a phenomenon which appears to the 
individual in the experience of a particular object. A phenomenon was 
understood to contain two components; first, the sensation, which is
9primarily a property of the object, and, secondly, one's own particular 
apparatus which orders the various parts of the sensory experience into 
a perceptual whole. The individual thus provides active synthesis of 
what is ultimately perceived and understood.
For Kant the physiological givens which determine what we see and 
perceive also prepare one to order the world into a set number of a 
priori categories consisting of the subtypes of quantity, quality, 
relation and modality. The event of perception typically calls upon 
the individual to make a whole of the disparate sensory elements imping­
ing on him at that instant and to match this with an a priori form from 
the relevant categories at his disposal. The transcendental schema was 
Kant's notion of an a priori template against which to compare the 
novel sensory experience so that it might be categorized and then 
assimilated. The sensory contents of nature which were constantly 
compared against transcendental schemata were divided into units of 
perception which Kant called appearances.
There were two fundamental a priori forms or intuitions which Kant 
posited. One of these was the intuition of space, by which was meant 
the innate outer sense of reality. The other a priori intuition was 
that of time, which Kant termed our internal sense. Together these 
intuitions were seen to assist man in determining categories of 
phenomena through application of innate rules governing the perception 
of particular stimuli.
To elucidate further his notion of the a priori, Kant discussed 
the distinctions between empirical and a priori propositions. Empiri­
cal propositions were those known only with the help of sense 
perception. Examples of academic studies reliant primarily on
10
empirical propositions would include history, geography and the obser­
vational sciences. A priori propositions, by contrast, have their 
basis in a reality that supercedes experience but yet may be made 
manifest through experience. Kant used the example of the mathematical 
proposition, 2 + 2 = 4 ,  as a clear immutable a priori reality. Yet the 
concrete representation of this abstract notion would involve an experi­
mental component (e.g.,a young child manipulating building blocks).
The brief sampling of theoretical notions of epistemology 
presented above points to several consistent differences between 
empiricist and rationalist approaches to the problem of knowledge.
These differences range across the scope of human inquiry; they are 
present in contrasting understandings of the cosmos and in differing 
views on highly particular considerations of learning and language.
They betoken fundamental discord between the empiricist and rationalist 
beliefs concerning the nature of man. Skepticism characterizes Hume's 
attitude toward the average man's effort to go beyond the very 
immediate sensory information in his environemnt; Mr. Everyman is seen 
as bound to the limitations of instinct and custom, incapable of 
appreciating subtlety or perceptual constancies until he becomes some­
thing of a philosopher. By contrast, Descartes would argue that all is 
possible through the exercise of reason in inquiry. In the Cartesian 
system, well disciplined thought is both a foolproof method of reach­
ing solutions to problems and also a form of evidence for one's own 
existence.
The role of experience in generating human understanding repre­
sents another clear cleavage between the approaches of 17th and 18th 
century empiricists and rationalists. For Hobbes, Hume and especially
11
Locke experience and the exercise of sense are the sole means for 
accumulating knowledge and eventually achieving the capacity for 
abstract thought. This differs sharply from the thought of Descartes, 
Leibniz and Kant who all stress the innate capability to impose order 
and categorize experience into meaningful, abstract propositions.
Those theorists who treat the place of language in their respec­
tive systems maintain the empiricist/rationalist dichotomy. Hobbes and 
Locke discussed language, and particularly naming, as an arbitrary 
process in which speech sounds take on meaning through repeated pairing 
with referents in the environment. A diametrically opposite view is 
seen in the work of Leibniz when he wrote that all language and naming 
is, per se, meaningful and that the goodness of fit of the name will 
become apparent as our knowledge of the referent improves. It should 
be noted parenthetically that these opposing positions on language were 
essentially identical to those represented in Plato's dialogue, The 
Cratylus, some twenty centuries before the birth of Locke, Kant or 
Leibniz. In the dialogue, the protagonist, Hermogenes, rebuts Cratylus' 
nativist position by saying one name is no less correct than the one it 
replaces, and therefore we can change the names of things "just as we 
change the names of our slaves" (Fowler 1926).
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The Associationists
The date frequently given for the founding of psychology as a 
scientific discipline is 1879. This is the date of the establishment 
of the first psychology laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt at the University 
of Leipzig. This was the first laboratory devoted exclusively to
12
experimental and physiological psychology in the world, and its founder 
was one of the most prodigious laborers and publishers in the history 
of academic psychology. While trained originally in medicine, Wundt 
held professional appointments in philosophy and psychology as well as 
physiology. His productive scholarship flourished in these three areas 
simultaneously.
Wundt's systematic psychology was distinctly associationist and 
atomistic. Although Wundt's laboratory methods were introspective, he 
attempted to focus on microscopic elements of human sensation and per­
ception by giving his subjects special instructions to limit the scope 
of their attention and report. The goal of these analytic instructions 
was to isolate sensations and identify them as minuscule phenomena, 
which, in turn, might be compounded into more complex sensations through 
association. For example, Wundt's tridimensional theory of feeling 
held that a given feeling could be exhaustively described, via com­
pounding, using the dimensions of pleasantness-unpleasantness, strain- 
relaxation and excitement-calm.
The fundamental subject matter for Wundt's psychology was human 
experience. By so asserting, Wundt wished to distinguish his psychology 
from metaphysics. This represented a departure from the work of many 
of his predecessors in German psychology (e.g., Fechner and Lotze), and 
it was probably his insistence on this change of emphasis that forged 
psychology as a separate discipline. Wundt wished to distinguish the 
subject matter of psychology from that of philosophy (i.e., inner 
experience) on the one hand and that of physics (i.e., mediated experi­
ence) on the other. Consequently, Wundt claimed that psychology's
13
field of investigation was that of immediate experience using the 
method of introspection (Boring 1950) .
Hermann von Helmholtz was a senior contemporary of Wundt's but 
preferred to consider himself exclusively a physiologist and physicist 
interested in problems of sensation and perception. Much of his work 
centered on measuring and mapping human report of visual and auditory 
stimulation; he theorized extensively in both of these areas, and his 
chief works, Handbuch der physiogischen Optik and Tonempfindungen were 
presentations of his experimental findings and conclusions.
As a philosopher of science and epistemologist, Helmholtz was 
decidedly empiricist in approach. He did not write a formal exposition 
of his system, but his writings on method make it clear that he shared 
Wundt's affinity with the thought of Locke and Mill. He went to con­
siderable pain to dissociate himself from Kantian notions which were 
dominant in German academia during his early education. He had 
objections to the nativist assumptions of perceptual a priori and the 
presumed intuitions of time and space. Essentially, Helmholtz com­
plained that nativist theorists "plunged in" with elaborate and 
speculative explanations regarding the physiological determinants of 
perceptual images without benefit of experimental data. Indeed, he 
felt much of his own work was suggestive of the development of percep­
tions in experience. Helmholtz also wrote extensive arguments aginst 
the Kantian assertion that geometric axioms are a priori intuitions.
He cited evidence for the experiential basis of the acquisition of 
geometric reasoning in the general method of teaching the rules of 
congruence and similarity through physical imposition of one form on 
another (Boring 1950).
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American psychology in its functionalist and behaviorist forms 
shared Helmholtz's commitment to parsimony in exploration of human 
perception and behavior. John W. Watson, the founder of American 
behaviorism, renounced all nativist and introspectionist trappings and 
insisted on systematic observation of behavior as the only legitimate 
data for psychological research. All behavior was, in turn, understood 
as responses to stimuli of the organism; the linkage between a given 
stimulus and response was adopted from Pavlov's notion of conditioned 
reflex. He assiduously avoided any suggestion of a theory of human 
knowledge for fear of falling prey to subjectivism that is not veri­
fiable experimentally. Watson's commitment to externalization of 
psychic phenomena was so complete that he preferred to regard thought 
as subvocal speech rather than to give credence to any introspective 
process. An active polemicist for his extreme associationist position, 
Watson wished to make psychology a natural science on an equal footing 
with chemistry and physics. As such, psychology needed no recourse to 
introspection or consideration of epistemology (Watson 1913) .
The Nativists
The Gestalt psychologists were among the most prominent adherents 
to the nativist/idealist tradition in twentieth century psychology.
The three men credited with creating and articulating the main tenets 
of this approach to the study of perception were Max Wertheimer, 
Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka. They collaborated on perceptual 
research at the University of Frankfort, and they all emigrated to the 
United States when Hitler came to power.
As an intellectual movement Gestalt psychology was a reaction
15
against the atomistic theories of Fechner, Wundt and Helmholtz which had 
come to dominate studies of perception in Germany. Once transplanted 
on American soil, it combatted the stimulus-response atomism of behav­
iorism. In contrast to these elemental theories, Gestalt presented 
itself as a field theory which regarded behavior as occurring within 
an environmental field composed of various force vectors. This environ­
mental surround can provide a contrasting ground for a figure which may 
appear and become increasingly differentiated from the ground as its 
contours and boundaries become articulated. As the figure, or gestalt, 
appears to the onlooker to show increasing organization and symmetry, 
it demonstrates the gestalt law of pragnanz, which maintains that a 
figure will be as regular and stable as prevailing environmental 
conditions permit. A corollary to this principle is the observed 
phenomenon of closure, in which an uncompleted drawn figure is per­
ceived to be whole and complete (i.e.,"closed"). The hypothesized 
tension within a person to bring about closure perceptually also 
operates in the cognitive sphere to motivate the person to finish a 
task or to achieve a definite opinion about something, etc.
While Gestalt theorists preferred to see themselves as experi­
menters in perception, it is clear that their assumptions have 
implications for an epistemology. It is implicit, for example, that 
the process of creating a figure against a ground occurs within the 
person as a spontaneous event and is not a product of the piecemeal 
association of elements. This inner tendency to view reality holisti­
cally demonstrates the principle of isomorphism, which maintains that a 
point for point correspondence exists between the inner concept of a 
thing and its outer manifestation. In other words, there is a preset
16
patterning of neural impulses which communicates the notions of round­
ness, squareness, redness, etc. and applies these concepts to objects 
in the environment which have these attributes (Koffka 1935).
Wolfgang Kohler applied the principles of Gestalt psychology to 
the study of language in an effort to determine the perceptual potency 
of certain speech sounds. He argued that the metaphoric and poetic 
use of language came into being because of the cross-modal, or isomor­
phic, equivalence of various phenomena. This isomorphism leads one to 
describe grief as "bitter" or an opaque visual image as "fuzzy."
Kohler went further with his studies of verbal isomorphism by exploring 
the propensity of nonmeaningful speech sounds to engender spontaneous 
association matches for individuals. Specifically, he reported that a 
large majority of subjects preferred to see an angular, pointed figure 
as a takete and a rounded figure as a maluma. In this instance, Kohler 
seemed to equate a type of synesthesia with the cross-modality he dis­
cussed in terms of poetic metaphor. In both instances, the argument 
for isomorphic representation is stressed (Kohler 1927). Cross- 
cultural confirmation of Kohler's results was provided in a replication 
of his study using monolingual Tanganyikans as subjects (Davis 1961).
Researchers in ethology, animal psychology and developmental 
psychology have reported numerous evidences of complex, nonatomistic 
behavior patterns and perceptual tendencies. The work of Konrad Lorenz 
on imprinting highlighted an inborn need for ducklings to attach to a 
caregiver; this need was discovered to be sufficiently potent to 
promote attachments to humans (Gibson 1969). The presence of clear 
preferences for certain response patterns in the acquisition of avoid­
ance learning suggested to Bolles that animals possess species-specific
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defense reactions which will tend to be more easily learned and less 
easily extinguished than behaviors incompatible with such reactions 
(Rachlin 1976). T. G. R. Bower investigated perceptual constancy among 
human infants ranging in age from 70 to 85 days. He discovered that the 
infants were able to discriminate between a 12-inch cube placed at a 
distance of three feet and a 36-inch cube placed at a distance of nine 
feet. Since the retinal displacement of each of these cases would be 
equivalent, Bower concluded that the infants demonstrated perceptual 
constancy well in advance of when it had been assumed to occur (particu­
larly according to behavioral developmental theorists) (Gibson 1969).
The research of Fantz on form perception showed that infants aged two 
to six weeks have distinct preferences for certain geometric shapes as 
well as a definite tendency to orient to stimuli approximating the 
human face. These perceptual preferences showed themselves as visual 
acuity matured sufficiently to permit perceptual registration (Fantz 
1958).
The organismic psychology of Heinz Werner represents another theor­
etical scheme that participates in the idealist/nativist tradition. 
Werner's psychology was a biologically based understanding of human 
development and cognitive growth. A succinct summary of his theory is 
found in his orthogenetic principle, which states that "whenever devel­
opment occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack 
of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articula­
tion and hierarchical integration" (Baldwin 1967). Werner applied this 
principle to the development of individuals and societies, believing 
that diffuse and global organization within a collective was a clear 
analog to the young child or even the psychotic person showing develop­
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mental impairment. Although enormous differences in the particular are 
seen among primitive societies, young children and schizophrenics,
Werner felt that they share a common globality and lack of differentia­
tion. Furthermore, such lack of differentiation was understood to be 
organic and maturational rather than the mere lack of opportunity to 
engage in associative learning.
Capacity to develop normally was believed to require the success­
ful resolution of several critical sub-issues of differentiation:
1) The first of these is syncretic vs. discrete cognition. Syncresis 
implies a fusion of thought contents into wholes which are inappropri­
ate in the functioning adult. An example might be that of synaesthesia, 
in which two senses are merged, and the reported sense experience might 
be of hearing color in sound or smelling a bright odor. Greater dis­
creteness and separability of sense perception is characteristic of a 
higher level of differentiation and development. 2) Diffuse vs. 
articulated. Articulation assumes greater specialization and effective 
coordination among separate parts of an organism toward the achievement 
of goals. Diffuseness, by contrast, suggests an inability to establish 
executive control over the whole system and a lack of harmony of 
function of the separate parts. 3) Rigid vs. flexible and labile vs. 
stable. These two dichotomies taken together describe closely related 
aspects of maturing mental function. Well differentiated persons will 
prefer variety in stimulation and behavioral expression. Immature or 
pathological rigidity is characterized by perseveration, ritual and 
inability to innovate or shift set. Stability is an outcome of flexi­
bility, in that novelty does not pose challenges to the well being of 
the system; it can adapt and evolve (Baldwin 1967).
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Werner and Kaplan's work, Symbol Formation (1963) applied the 
organismic theory to the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of 
language. One of the key concepts discussed by these authors was that 
of physiognomization, the movement and tensions of facial musculature 
when speech is produced. Theory would hold that the global and undif­
ferentiated speech of the primitive shows the highest correlation 
between facial and bodily movement and that eventual erosion of this 
relationship occurs as speech becomes more differentiated and articu­
late. As this process takes place the semantic function of speech 
depends less and less on immediate, affective and onomatopoeic 
properties and shifts to more cognitive and descriptive functions.
Some of Werner's research is suggestive of a noncognitive, affec­
tive residue in the highly differentiated speech of twentieth century 
humans. In an experiment involving tachistoscopic presentation of 
common nouns, subjects were unable to read the words because the shutter 
speed was well below reading threshold. However, many people were able 
to give adjectives and attributes which are commonly associated with 
the word. For example, one person said of the word, twig, that it gave 
her the sense of brittleness. Werner described this result as an 
example of microgenesis, where there is a gradual unfolding of feeling 
significance of the word prior to actual recognition (Werner and Kaplan
1963).
%
LINGUISTIC AND PSYCHOLINGUISTIC THEORY 
The Associationists
Leonard Bloomfield made a considerable impact on the development 
of linguistic theory in the United States during the first three
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decades of this century. He regarded himself as a taxonomist of human 
language, and, as such, he sought to observe, categorize and define the 
various attributes of language. However, in the process of classifica­
tion Bloomfield revealed an associationist bias through discussion of 
"stimuli which cause an act of speech and the reactions to it."
Bloomfield distinguished between mentalistic and mechanistic 
explanations of speech and language, and he expressed the view that the 
mechanistic (i.e. behavioral) approach is preferable in scientific dis­
course because of its hard-headed insistence on the external facts 
without any mention of internal images, ideas, etc. In the 1933 edition 
of his text on language he stated that his revision of the 1914 work 
had deleted several passages using application of Wundt's psychology, 
presumably due to its reliance on introspection. Although he did not 
credit Watson for having influenced his adoption of a radical mechan- 
istic/materialistic position, his decision to limit linguistic 
observation to behavioral phenomena is consonant with Watson's position. 
He wrote that the mechanist interprets mental images and feelings to be 
"merely popular terms for various bodily movements" which fall into one 
of three categories: 1) large scale processes which have social 
importance and are represented in conventional ways (e.g. "I'm 
hungry"); 2) obscure and variable muscular and glandular activity which 
vary among people; and 3) soundless movements of the vocal organs, 
taking the place of speech-movements, but not perceptible to others 
(Bloomfield 1933).
The French linguist Saussure is generally classed as a structural­
ist, and, as such, one might expect him to be discussed among nativists 
or gestalt theorists. Saussure appears to differ from Kohler and other
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nativist/structuralists in that he acknowledged structural order solely 
as the result of years of social interaction and evolution, that is as 
an associationistic process. Saussure distinguished language from 
speech, which he regarded as a broad category including the instinctual, 
physiological capability to utter sound. Language, by contrast, 
referred to the oral and written symbolic system of a cultural com­
munity. Although Saussure believed the use of the human vocal appara­
tus came into being for its efficiency and ease of use, he did not 
believe human vocal utterance possesses semantic relevance. This 
position clearly contrasts with physiognomic theory as presented by 
Werner.
For Saussure the speech sound or sign is entirely arbitrary. The 
bond between speech sound and its referent was seen as the result of an 
associative process stamped in by years of convention within the com­
munity. He wrote "the idea of sister is not linked by an inner rela­
tionship to the succession of sounds . . . . " In effect, Saussure 
made the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign the cornerstone of 
his linguistic system because he felt that the chance of building a 
thoroughly consistent, rule-governed language would be greatest when 
little is owed to the distant, instinctual past. The Saussurian ideal 
would be a situation in which all speech sounds would have an equal 
chance of representing a given referent. Saussure objected to the use 
of the word symbol, preferring instead sign, because a symbol is never 
wholly arbitrary; it carries the rudiment of a natural bond between the 
sign and its referent (DeGeorge and DeGeorge 1972) .
The psychologist B. F. Skinner is included in the discussion of 
linguists and psycholinguists because of his contribution to the
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literature of linguistics, or verbal behavior, as he preferred to call 
it. Like Saussure, Skinner was reluctant to pursue antecedent, internal 
ideas or symbols in the course of inquiry on verbal behavior. Skinner 
made this clear when he juxtaposed traditional formulations with his 
own notions of verbal behavior. Whereas linguistics had spent its 
energy in recording and analyzing speech sounds and practices, little 
had been done to study the causality of verbal behavior in an effort 
to predict and control it. Skinner stated that other disciplines 
failed to achieve a causal/functional analysis of verbal behavior due 
to the insistence on associating utterances with ideas and meanings. 
Skinner disputed such practices as unscientific because they render the 
behavior exempt from control or measurement. Skinner objected to the 
notion that verbal behavior, per se, is meaningful. He believed that 
meaning is not a property of any behavior as such but rather of the 
conditions under which the behavior occurs. Psychologically, Skinner 
regarded verbal behavior as a dependent variable, and he wished to 
claim that meanings are to be found only in independent variables.
Skinner believed that a new formulation of inquiry into verbal 
behavior should follow the rules of any other behavioral science. 
Specifically, he stated that the first responsibility of such a science 
is that of any infant science, namely observation and description. As 
one conducts systematic observation of verbal behavior, one learns the 
unique conditions of its occurrence and also gains an awareness of the 
variables of which it is a function. Still in the course of observa­
tion, the behavioral scientist will note differential outcomes and 
consequences of various verbal behaviors and will become able to make 
informal inference as to which types are most effective. The latter
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observational step is the precursor to gaining experimental prediction 
and control (Skinner 1957).
The Nativists
Roman Jakobson was both an acute observer of verbal behavior and a 
practiced taxonomist in the Bloomfieldian sense. Yet he was assertedly 
structuralist in his way of viewing language; he agreed with the notion 
that language could be studied as a kind of algebra. Much of his work 
appears to be a direct refutation of the Saussurian doctrine of arbi­
trariness and a strong support for nativist conceptualizations in 
linguistics. He cited the work of the 19th century philosopher, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, who divided linguistic signs into three categories:
1) the icon, which bears a close resemblance to the thing signified,
2) the index, which depends on existential (spatial and temporal) co­
occurrence with the referent, and 3) the symbol, which acts chiefly by 
imputed or learned contiguity with the object signified. Jakobson 
remarked that Saussure's insistence on arbitrariness of signs limits 
his consideration to the last category, that is, the one which mini­
mizes any inherent bond between the signifier and signified. In effect, 
Peirce's theory suggests that any given word will participate partially 
in all three forms of signification but with a predominant manifesta­
tion in one. For example, an onomatopoeic word might be mainly iconic 
yet have some indexing and symbolic qualities as well. Cassirer wrote 
in the same vein and posited a three-stage temporal evolution of 
language, in which human speech was seen to undergo a transformation 
from mimetic reproduction to high level abstraction and symbolization
(Cassirer 1953).
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For Jakobson, the case for application of structuralist principles 
in both syntax and semantics was compelling. In terms of word mor­
phology, for example, he noted that Indo-European languages treat 
adjectives in a similar manner in that the length of the adjective 
increases as it progresses from the positive to the comparative and 
superlative degrees (e.g. high— higher— highest, altus— altior—  
altissimus). Another instance of suggested inherent structure is in 
the morphology of family affine terms across languages, e.g. father, 
mother, brother. These consistencies of structure led Jakobson to 
reject the radical associationist viewpoint of Saussure and to prefer 
instead explanations that acknowledge the contribution of millenia to 
the forming of linguistic categories of word morphology and syntax 
(Jakobson 1965).
Noam Chomsky took the formulations of Jakobson and coordinated 
them with his own studies in syntax and transformational grammar to 
generate strong assertions on the innate character of language. Chomsky 
and his mentor, Zellig Harris, noted and diagrammed structural con­
sistencies in various languages, and they began to theorize over the 
possibility of structural universals that can be found in the syntax of 
languages. An exhaustive exploratory study revealed that one could not 
guarantee that a structural category found in one language could be 
found in another. Chomsky modified his initial theoretical position to 
account for this by adopting the mathematical notion of the "empty 
set." Environmental influences might exert themselves in such a way 
that some of the available sets or categories in transformational gram­
mar might not be employed. In this sense, Chomsky understood 
environmental effects providing "boundary conditions" for a language.
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Nonetheless, Chomsky believed that activation of initially empty sets—  
for example, in the learning of a second language— provided confirma­
tion of their universal status. An example of this phenomenon could be 
cited in the case of the English speaking person learning French and 
mastering the distinction between polite and familiar forms of address, 
a concept which dropped out of English as it evolved to its present 
form.
Another piece of evidence that Chomsky mentioned to buttress his 
case for the innateness of language structure is the fact of universal 
expertise in the performance of routine speech; this skill was noted 
across all levels of educational attainment. Although a certain amount 
of grammatical variability is correlated with socioeconomic level (e.g. 
"he don't know" vs. "he doesn't know"), certain errors of word order 
almost never occur. For example, a sentence like, "is the man who tall 
is in the room?," would never be used.
Chomsky claimed that the native speaker's predisposition to access 
proper word order in expressing his thoughts provided evidence for a 
deep structure of language. Deep structure carries both syntactic and 
semantic importance, in that it implies the existence of species- 
specific cognitive abilities which assist the native user in organizing 
and apprehending verbal input. Surface structure, contrasted with deep 
structure, is the manifest order and presentation in oral and written 
language. Chomsky noted that sentences such as, "they ran after 
lunch," and "they ran after John," possess similar surface structures 
but very different deep structures; the fact that the vast majority of 
the population appreciates the difference between these sentences is 
offered as confirmation of the deep/surface distinction. Another form
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of evidence is suggested in the developmental literature where the 
phenomenon of overregularization is cited in language acquisition. 
Three-year old children are often heard to apply grammatical rules in 
instances that are exceptions to these rules (e.g. "my foots are cold."). 
These errors suggested to Chomsky a "wired-in" capacity to apply a 
language's rules of invariance in novel situations (Chomsky 1980,
1975).
PHONETIC SYMBOLISM RESEARCH: A SEGMENT 
OF THE NATIVIST— ASSOCIATION!ST DEBATE
The preceding discussion has attempted to illustrate the degree of 
polarization between the intellectual descendents of Plato and those of 
Aristotle within the disciplines of philosophy, psychology and linguis­
tics. The associationists are true to Aristotle's goal of scrupulous 
observation and classification of phenomena. This group shows a 
tendency to limit observation to the microscopic level of analysis in 
hopes of gaining predictive control of it; one seeks the smallest 
possible unit of analysis. Typically, these units are understood to be 
additive building blocks of larger verbal behaviors which become complex 
in the learning and reinforcement history of the individual. Verbal 
behaviors are seen as meaningful only as they are reliably associated 
with referents in the environment; they carry no inherent meaning them­
selves. Consciousness and internal thought processes are not thought 
to be contributors to verbal behavior.
The idealist/nativist camp reacted against the atomistic, micro­
scopic approach of the associationists and offered in its stead a 
holistic analysis of behavioral/cognitive phenomena and language. 
Experimentalists among the nativists felt that they had demonstrated
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the existence of "wired in" perceptual skills which reaffirmed the 
Kantian notion of a priori. Some of these theorists stressed the 
importance of an organismic and ontogenetic unfolding of capacity as 
the organism matures and differentiates. Some of the linguists espous­
ing nativist principles note consistencies of form, reference and 
syntax across languages which suggest to them a predisposing set for 
order of words and meaning in phonemic convention. They disputed as 
naive the Saussurian insistence on the arbitrariness of the sign.
The Gestalt influence on holistic conceptualizations of research 
was strong in Germany from 1920 onward. Von Hornbostel (1924) applied 
the doctrine of isomorphism to his synaesthetic view of perception 
which he discussed as "a unity of the senses." He reported informal 
experimental evidence for the matching of brightness perception across 
the modalities of olfaction, audition and vision. Depending largely 
on his introspective acuteness, Von Hornbostel isolated six dimensions 
for sound symbolism, one of the many facets of unity within the senses; 
these dimensions were intensity and rhythm, duration, pitch movement, 
pitch of voice, vowel brightness and consonant strength. A student of 
primitive language, Von Hornbostel used African tribal languages to 
support his isomorphic theory; many of these tongues are heavily melodic 
or tonal and make use of devices such as clicks and whistles. Usnadze 
(1924) took Von Hornbostel's notion of sense unity a step further and 
did a study requiring the matching of nonsense figures to a wide variety 
of sound complexes (door slamming, pot clanging, etc.). Percentage of 
agreement ranged from 25 to 45 among the six figures used.
In the United States, Edward Sapir (1929) is credited with initi­
ating experimentation on the semantic properties of nonlinguistic words
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and also with coining the phrase phonetic symbolism to account for 
these inherent properties. His approach was similar to that of Kohler, 
whose experiment was mentioned earlier, but there was an attempt to 
maintain better control over the stimulus materials. Instead of offer­
ing subjects the choice of two very different stimulus items (i.e., 
Kohler's takete and maluma) Sapir varied only the center vowel in a 
series of three letter words (CVC trigrams). Specifically, for the 
size dimension, Sapir asked subjects to consider that mil and mal might 
refer to tables of different size; he then asked the subjects to decide 
whether the mil or the mal was the larger of the two tables. Over 80 
percent of the subjects assigned greater size to the mal, suggesting to 
Sapir that the letter a. has greater magnitude sound symbolism than does 
jl. Sapir varied the consonants in his stimulus words, and his results 
were stable. In comparing other vowel pairings, he noted the greater 
size symbolic difference was evoked for some vowel pairs (e.g. , _i and <d, 
e^ and a_) than for others (e.g., e^ and jL, io and u) . Newman (1933) did a 
replication of Sapir's study in which he attempted to map the change of 
the size of the oral cavity in relation to the vowel produced and the 
magnitude perceived by the subject. He found a consistent increase in 
magnitude perception as the tongue recedes in the mouth from the pro­
nunciation of _i to c).
Evidence contrary to the phonetic symbol phenomenon was cited by 
Bentley and Varon (1933) who used an experimental design very different 
from Sapir's or Newman's. Using a small number of trained observers, 
Bentley and Varon instructed these people to free associate to ten 
target CVC trigrams. They reported that none of the observer responses 
to their stimuli were suggestive of magnitude symbolism. These writers
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concluded that the phonetic symbolism phenomenon was artifactual in 
that it would only appear in a forced choice situation. They argued 
that a genuine and potent phenomenon should occur spontaneously through 
free association.
In addition to research with nonmeaningful sound complexes, 
another branch of phonetic symbolism research developed which investi­
gated a subject's ability to guess the meaning of words from an 
unfamiliar foreign language. Tsuru (1934) and Tsuru and Fries (1933) 
objected to the artificiality of the exercises using nonlinguistic 
stimulus materials and preferred to study the strength of the phonetic 
symbolism effect with living languages. The theoretical approach of 
Tsuru and others centered on the belief that more powerful inferences 
could be made concerning the innate properties of phonetic symbolism if 
subjects are able to sense the meanings of words in languages which have 
a different line of evolution from their own. Effort was made to 
insure ignorance of the target language by screening subjects at the 
outset and, in general, biasing selection to favor monolingual speakers. 
Tsuru's stimulus items were Japanese words presented visually (in 
transliterated form) in antonym pairs. The subjects, who had no 
familiarity with Japanese, were asked to match each stimulus pair with 
the appropriate English translation pair member presented simultane­
ously. Tsuru found that his subjects performed this matching task 
significantly above chance level.
Criticisms of Tsuru's methodology were raised by Roger Brown 
(1958), who noted that Tsuru, himself, selected the Japanese and 
English antonyms for use in the study. Brown suggested that the possi­
bility of experimenter bias existed in an inadvertent preference for
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stimulus items bearing similarity to English word pairs. Allport 
(1935) performed a replication of Tsuru's study and eliminated the 
potential source of bias by using a native speaker of a new target 
language (Hungarian) to make translations of Tsuru's English glosses 
into his own language. Since Allport's native speaker was ignorant of 
the purpose of the study, it was felt that his range of choice for 
foreign word pairs would be less subject to biasing constraints.
Allport and his student, Rich (1953), who did a later replication, 
obtained statistically significant results in support of natural 
language phonetic symbolism.
Thorndike (1946) did an unusual study requiring the matching of 
22 English phrases with 12 single nouns in English. No restrictions 
were placed on the number of times a noun might be used. Thorndike 
determined that each of the 22 phrases had a close semantic associate 
in one of the noun stimuli in ancient Greek. For example, the Greek 
word for hand was the equivalent for act or deed in that language. He 
wished to investigate whether English speaking students with no knowl­
edge of Greek had any predisposition to pair English nouns and phrases 
in the ancient Greek manner. He found statistically significant agree­
ment ranging from 27 to 90 percent for five of the 22 phrases and 
chance level agreement for the remaining 17 phrases. Thorndike 
interpreted his results as confirmation of the associationist position 
that signs acquire meanings through conventional habitual pairing 
rather than through any deep, innate connection.
Brown, Black and Horowitz (1955) were intrigued by the consistently 
potent results obtained by Tsuru, Allport and Rich, and they attempted 
to tease out methodological variance in yet a third replication of the
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Tsuru experiment. Again they used blind translation of antonym lists 
into their three target languages, Czech, Chinese and Hindi. And again 
aural and visual (transliteration) presentations of stimulus words were 
made. Brown et al. again noted overall significance in favor of the 
phonetic symbolism phenomenon (p < .01). Closer scrutiny of individual 
word pairs revealed a high degree of item variability in terms of 
phonetic symbolism potential with about half of the pairs reaching the 
.01 level of correct judgment and one quarter achieving the same level 
for incorrect judgment. In a manipulation which compared visual only 
to visual plus auditory presentation of stimulus words, it was noted 
that in the visual only condition the number of significantly correct 
judgments dropped off markedly while the number of significantly incor­
rect judgments dropped to zero. Apparently, the contribution of voice 
expressiveness is inconsistent and unreliable though potent. One chief 
finding in this section of the study was the seeming robustness of the 
visual only presentation. Unfortunately, Brown et al. used considerably 
fewer subjects in their visual only condition ( n = 16 vs. n = 36 in 
the visual plus aural condition); this greatly decreased degrees of 
freedom and made it difficult for many individual pairs to achieve sig­
nificance (even though the mean percent correct score was 61.5 overall). 
Noting overall high guess rates across widely divergent language 
groups, these investigators concluded that the phonetic universals 
hypothesis was confirmed. However, they were reluctant to ascribe to a 
nativist position, claiming that widespread associationist processes 
could have occurred in distant linguistic history.
A replication of Brown et al. was done by Maltzman, Morrisett and 
Brooks (1956) using Japanese and Croatian as test languages, and they
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achieved a very high level of significance for that portion of their 
study which was essentially identical to Brown et al. (p < .0001). 
Maltzman et al. introduced an innovation requiring subjects to match 
two sets of foreign words rather than an English word to its foreign 
equivalent. These investigators reasoned that a foreign-foreign pair 
match would provide a more rigorous test of the phonetic universals 
hypothesis, since the physiognomic speech mechanisms postulated by 
nativist theorists should operate even if a subject were ignorant of 
both languages used. Performance did not exceed chance level in this 
condition, and these investigators discounted the findings of the first 
part of their study to conclude that phonetic symbolism was discon- 
f irmed.
In an exceptionally well controlled and comprehensive study, 
Brackbill and Little (1957) probed the phonetic universals hypothesis 
along a number of dimensions. Manipulations included varying language 
pairings (English-foreign vs. foreign-foreign) and mode of stimulus word 
presentation (auditory alone, visual alone and auditory and visual 
together). Instead of using antonym pair comparisons as had been done 
by Tsuru, Brown et al. and Maltzman et al., Brackbill and Little's 
design required subjects to state whether two simultaneously presented 
words meant the same or different things. Results they achieved were 
interesting in that they were different from those of Brown et al. and 
also from those of Maltzman et al. Significance levels were not nearly 
as high as those obtained in the antonym pair research of Tsuru, Brown 
et al. and Maltzman et al., and there was no consistent pattern across 
modes of presentation or language pairs. Also, whereas Maltzman et al. 
noted nonsignificant findings for a foreign-foreign (Japanese-Croation)
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antonym pairing, Brackbill and Little reported some of their most sig­
nificant findings in the foreign-foreign conditions (Chinese-Japanese 
and Hebrew-Japanese).
A study examining antonymic and same/different judgment tasks was 
done by Brown and Nuttall (1959), and, unfortunately, their findings 
did offer ambiguous answers to the theoretical questions raised in this 
discussion of modes of presentation. As expected, they did find that 
their subjects achieved greatest success in guessing word meanings in 
the English-foreign antonym pair task (p < .0001); lowest but still 
statistically significant performance levels were obtained for the 
foreign-foreign antonym task (p < .05). Paradoxically, intermediate 
success was seen on the same/different judgment task for the English- 
foreign condition (p < .01). These findings were contrary to the 
investigators' hypothesis which followed Sapir's and Newman's formula­
tion regarding the necessity of providing dimensional pairs on which 
the subject can then form hypotheses. Presumably such tentative 
hypotheses would use information communicated in the vowel-consonant 
combinations relating to magnitude, brightness, etc. Brown and 
Nuttall's conclusion overlooks this contradiction and reports the 
superiority of the English-foreign over the foreign-foreign group as 
confirmation of the existing theory which suggested the need for 
"anchoring" the subject in a familiar semantic dimension.
Weiss (1963, 1966) conducted further investigations of the need to 
use antonym pairs in phonetic symbolism research. In his first study 
Weiss compared a condition in which English and foreign word antonym 
pairs were presented to another condition in which words were scrambled 
and presented in randomly mixed pairs. Essentially two hypotheses were
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tested: a) if antonyms were necessary, then subjects in the first con­
dition only should achieve significantly correct guessing and b) if 
antonyms were not necessary but somehow aided the guessing procedure 
(assuming subjects in both conditions achieve significantly correct 
guessing), then subjects in the first condition should do significantly 
better than subjects in the second. The findings showed that subjects 
in both conditions achieved significantly correct guessing and there 
were no differences between them. Weiss's second study was an attempt 
to control for the possibility that subjects might have implicitly 
supplied the missing antonyms and thereby unscrambled the mixed list; 
control was instituted by altering mixed stimulus items to include 
random nonantonym English word pairs to be matched with a single 
Japanese word. Again significantly correct guessing was obtained (p < 
.01). Weiss's overall conclusions were that "meaning dimensions," as 
offered in an antonym pair, is far less crucial than the availability of 
"meaning categories" provided by a comparison context. He asserted 
that subjects make use of as much information as they can, including 
dimensional information, but that their scope for internal hypothesis 
formation— perhaps based on innate capacity— is very broad. It follows 
then that weak performance seen in same/different judgment tasks is 
more a factor of low information yield than absence of polar dimensions.
Following his investigation of antonymic and nonantonymic word 
pairs, Weiss (1964) became involved in a theoretical debate with Taylor 
(1963) and Taylor and Taylor (1965) on the origins of the phonetic 
symbolism phenomenon. The Taylors maintained that differences among 
languages in terms of their attribution of meanings to vowel and conso­
nant combinations were far greater than the similarities the various
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language groups shared. Consequently, they proposed a theory based 
largely on associationistic principles which stated that a given lan­
guage would over the centuries come to exhibit a phonetic symbolism 
that would be unique to its own speaking community; they felt that 
variability within the data reported in the literature augered against 
the concept of phonetic universals. Their proposed theory asserted 
that a feedback mechanism will develop between subjective phonetic 
symbolism (exhibited by individuals) and objective phonetic symbolism 
(of language cultures); usages will fluctuate along a feedback loop 
over time to account for the evolution of word meanings and the latent 
meanings which may be experienced in obsolete speech patterns.
Weiss suggested his own theory to account for the variability in 
reported research results on phonetic universals. He reiterated his 
notion that an individual tends to derive information from a "meaning 
context" from the available cues, antonymic and otherwise. By exten­
sion, these cues become synthesized into implicit (perhaps unconscious) 
hypotheses which are then tried out in a test situation. Weiss 
explained that several different hypotheses might be entertained because 
of the likelihood that meaning correspondences with phonemes are not 
absolute but are, rather, relative and dependent upon context. There­
fore, many meanings may be associated with a given phoneme, and their 
relative frequencies will determine a hierarchy of usage within a par­
ticular language group and also between language communities. 
Consequently, substantial variability among language cultures will be 
noted with respect to phonetic symbolism; this variability tends to 
shrink somewhat when constraints are placed on a subject's set of 
alternatives— as, for example, occurs in the antonym pair task— and he
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is forced to sample meanings from several levels of his phonetic sym­
bolism hierarchy. This theory would suggest that a free association 
task such as Bentley and Varon's would tend to yield poor results 
because one is not forced to sample a semantic hierarchy.
Werner and Kaplan (1963) described the same kind of phenomenon in 
their discussion of language acquisition. Due to the relative glob- 
ality and undifferentiated state of the young child's linguistic 
capability, his speech is characterized by unarticulated babbling. At 
this stage, Werner described the child's experience of sounds as 
plurisignificant, that is, able to reference many things in the environ­
ment. With increasing articulation and differentiation, the child's 
speech matures, and distinct preferences for associating sounds to 
words is noted. But Werner was aware of the danger inherent in viewing 
this process as rigid and inexorable, leading to the definite 
association of one phoneme to one word complex. He referred to the 
latter assumption as "the fallacy of constant elements."
It has been suggested that plurisignificance or hierarchies of 
meanings for words in a natural language provides the source of poetic, 
figurative usage that is characterized by its connotative and affective 
qualities. In the late 1950's Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) 
pioneered a factor analysis technique for assessing the connotative, 
semantic content of words along a large number of attribute dimensions. 
It was observed that subjects showed remarkable consistency in their 
assignment of concepts to the semantic continua. Many of these conno­
tative, metaphoric associations were readily recognizable as familiar 
poetic devices and figures of speech, e.g., the greenness of envy or 
the heaviness of sorrow. Other consistently chosen associations
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appeared rather peculiar and puzzling, e.g., the sweetness of a 
boulder.
As the data became analyzed, Osgood et al. discovered that three 
main factors accounted for approximately 70 percent of the variance; 
these factors were labelled evaluation, potency and activity. Since 
these factors were orthogonal, the authors began to speak of charting 
concepts in three-dimensional octants of "semantic space." The tech­
nique became called the Semantic Differential, and it became a research 
tool to help evaluate the merits of nativist vs. associationist 
positions in explaining semantic/linguistic commonalities and 
disparities. One of its more prominent uses was in examining the 
Whorfian hypothesis that cognitive structures are a product of the 
syntactic and semantic constraints imposed by various languages (Whorf 
1962). Although studies using the Semantic Differential were far from 
unequivocal, they did offer moderate support to the alternate position, 
namely that cross-cultural universals of affective and connotative 
meaning do exist. Some of the less obvious dimensional consistencies, 
which Osgood chose to see as synaesthetic tendencies, may be part of a 
semantic domain of a higher order than that occupied by more denotative 
and immediately apparent definition. In this connection, the reader 
will recall an earlier discussion of the Gestalt theorist, Von 
Hornbostel, and his concept of the "unity of the senses." Interest­
ingly, McMurray (1960) reported that percentages of agreement among his 
subjects were no higher— and often were lower— when actual denotative 
synonyms were offered in a guessing task; McMurray's study was an 
attempt to adapt word pairs used by Brown et al. (1955) to analysis 
through the semantic differential method. (It will be recalled that
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Brown et al. used stimulus antonym pairs drawn from Czech, Hindi and 
Chinese.) McMurray's task required subjects to assign Semantic Differ­
ential scale values to each pair member belonging to the foreign word 
stimulus list. This meant that each word received a scale value along 
many continua (e.g. , hot-cold, fast-slow, etc.). McMurray interpreted 
his findings of high agreement for denotative meanings and also high 
agreement for meanings that appear to be more connotative as support 
for phonetic symbolism.
Investigation of the connotative impact of nonlinguistic stimulus 
items was pioneered by Iritani, a student of Werner. Pursuing Werner's 
notion of plurisignificance, Iritani constructed 35 nonlinguistic 
sound patterns and instructed his subjects to free associate responses 
to each pattern. This generated a very large amount of material which 
Iritani recorded and analyzed. Initially, he found very few instances 
of identical agreement between any two subjects; however, he did note 
some interesting consistencies when he subjected his results to more 
general dimensional analysis. Specifically, he compared his subjects' 
responses using six dimensional criteria (e.g., size, shape, bright­
ness, etc.), and his findings strongly suggested consistency of 
expressive properties in many stimulus items. Iritani did a follow-up 
experiment using these same items, but the second study limited sub­
jects' responses to the six dimensions he employed in post hoc fashion 
in the first study. His results revealed overwhelming agreement among 
subjects as to the expressive quality of sound patterns using this 
continuum marking procedure; in general, consensual choices were 
elicited along more than one dimension. In fact, in some instances a 
sufficient number of similar dimensional fixes were evoked to suggest
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synonymity and antonymity among the sound complexes. For example, it 
was found that ZECA and TAKI elicited the expressive values of small­
ness, angularity, brightness, motion and happiness; whereas, SALO, VOAG 
and HULO were related to largeness, roundness, darkness stasis and 
sadness (Iritani 1962).
Iritani's success stimulated the work of other students of Werner 
in the area of phonetic symbolism and psycholinguistics. Langer and 
Rosenberg (1964) pursued the line of research initiated by Iritani's 
nonlinguistic sound complexes, but they used subjects to indicate their 
own choices for association with specific spatial and color concepts. 
Subjects made their selections from a large pool of nonlinguistic words 
presented to them in written form by the investigators. The same pool 
of stimulus items was then re-presented to another group of subjects at 
another university, and results showed remarkable agreement between 
groups of subjects in terms of this tendency to associate color and 
form meanings to particular nonlinguistic words.
In order to examine the potency of these word complexes, or 
phonetic symbols, in terms of their efficacy to facilitate or inhibit 
memory storage, Langer, Sampson and Rosenberg (1966) designed a paired- 
associates learning task in which selected phonetic symbols were paired 
with color names. Pairs were defined as congruent if subjects from the 
norming study had consistently designated the symbol-referent pairs as 
matches (e.g., ZAH-RED, NERD-GREEN). Noncongruent pairs were those in 
which a phonetic symbol had not been matched with the referent but which 
had rather been paired with another color. Unrelated pairs were those 
in which the symbol had previously evoked an equiproportional distribu­
tion of choices within the color dimension (of four possibilities) and
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hence a random assignment of referent to symbol was made. The authors 
hypothesized that: a) pairs of phonetic symbols and congruent refer­
ents would be learned more readily than phonetic symbols paired with 
noncongruent or unrelated referents, b) more errors would be made with 
noncongruent pairs and that these errors would tend to be congruency 
errors, i.e., response referents chosen previously by the normative 
group, and c) congruent and noncongruent pairs would be learned more 
easily than unrelated pairs. All of these hypotheses were confirmed.
If occurred to Langer and Rosenberg (1966) that the phenomenon of 
congruency (or incongruency) of word-color association had already been 
amply researched for decades by psychologists using the Word Color 
Interference Test (WCIT) developed by Stroop (1935). Stroop's original 
WCIT demonstrated that ordinary verbal symbolic activity, i.e. reading, 
can interfere with task orientation when two modes of symbolic process­
ing are discrepant with one another. Discrepancy was induced when 
subjects were presented a list of color names printed in ink colors 
different from the printed name; longer latency in naming the ink color 
was noted in this condition. Langer and Rosenberg constructed an 
adaptation of the WCIT by substituting a phonetic symbol for the color 
name for which it showed maximum equivalence. Thus ZAH was used for 
red, NERD for green, etc. These investigators predicted that the 
phonetic symbols appearing in print color discrepant with their associ­
ated color should evoke the same interference effects as do the noncon­
gruent color names in the WCIT. This prediction was supported.
In a further demonstration of the potency of color phonetic sym­
bols, Langer, Stein and Rosenberg (1969) directed their research to a 
psychiatric population. They carried out a modification of a study done
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by Wapner and Krus (1960); the latter study found that schizophrenics 
evidenced greater interference (longer latencies) than normals on the 
WCIT. Wapner and Krus used Werner's Orthogenetic Principle of develop­
ment to explain this finding; they reasoned that schizophrenics should 
show a lower level of linguistic development and hence should manifest 
greater globality and less articulation and differentiation of 
linguistic symbol. This would imply a merger of symbol with referent 
and consequent frustration in one's attempts to maintain sufficient 
cognitive flexibility to shift from one dimension of the stimulus to 
another. Wapner and Krus stated that this loss of flexibility created 
confusion in the schizophrenic subjects and produced greater interfer­
ence effects on the WCIT.
Langer, Stein and Rosenberg shared a theoretical orientation 
similar to that of Wapner and Krus, in that much of their doctoral 
training had been in the organismic developmental conceptualizations of 
Heinz Werner. Consequently, Langer et al. predicted that interference 
effects in schizophrenics on their color phonetic symbol test would 
parallel those found by Wapner and Krus on the conventional WCIT. 
Specifically, they predicted that schizophrenics would show much more 
disruption than normals when reading color phonetic symbols printed in 
colors discrepant with their norm-determined appropriate color. This 
experimental hypothesis was confirmed. Although response latencies 
were higher in schizophrenics overall, the schizophrenic subjects mani­
fested a significantly greater difference in response latency between 
congruent and noncongruent stimuli than did normals. The significance 
of this study would appear to be two-fold: first, it fortifies 
previous research by Langer and his associates by offering further
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demonstration of the potency of phonetic symbols to elicit behaviors 
similar to those elicited by conventional words, and, secondly, it 
suggests an intrinsic advantage for the decoding and manipulating of 
phonetic symbols in persons free of gross psychopathology or psychosis.
If the explanation offered by Wapner and Krus for greater WCIT 
interference effects in schizophrenics is valid, it points to a basic 
difference in skill at reconciling discordant experiences at two levels 
of processing: the perceptual (seeing the color) and the cognitive 
(reading the color). For normals, such reconciliation is automatic 
because of a high degree of internal hierarchical cognitive governance 
which permits the person to disregard the irrelevant characteristics of 
the stimulus so that he can report on those characteristics that are 
demanded. The fact that schizophrenics, who show a deficit in recon­
ciling discrepant perceptual and higher order cognitive processes, also 
show a corresponding deficit on the phonetic symbol version of the WCIT 
suggests, perhaps, that similar cognitive and linguistic developmental 
plateaus must be achieved in order for a person to tap the realm of 
semantic/phonetic universals. In other words, perhaps it is true that 
the processing of both conventional word concepts and unconventional 
phonetic symbols requires a high level of differentiation and articu­
lation (to use Werner's terminology).
Low levels of differentiation and articulation are seen in the 
language of the child because there is insufficient maturation to 
support fully logical cognition and discrimination, i.e.,what Piaget 
called formal operations (Piaget and Inhelder 1969). Similarly, poor 
capacity for differentiation and articulation are present in the lan­
guage of the schizophrenic because of recurrent conceptual errors which
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characterize the content of his verbal expression. Consequently, many 
researchers have regarded the language of the schizophrenic as a clear 
marker for a thought disorder, which is the defining criterion of this 
psychotic condition.
PRIMARY PROCESS: PATHOLOGICAL AND 
NONPATHOLOGICAL MANIFESTATIONS
Most psychoanalytically oriented writers have assumed that the 
schizophrenic's loss of capacity for logical, organized thought has 
resulted from the interference of uncontrolled drive and instinct.
Freud believed that the schizophrenic was dominated by uninhibited, 
uncensored and instinctual cognition whose only rule required the 
immediate gratification of needs and reduction of drive tension; this 
type of cognition he named primary process thought. He contrasted it 
with secondary process thought, which is logical and oriented toward 
the demands of daily reality; it tends to block instinctual, affective 
expression and to censor taboo wishes. When expressed in speech, 
primary process will tend to be illogical, affective and full of sexual 
and aggressive content; it may also have a poetic or metaphoric quality. 
Secondary process speech is factual and nonaffective but capable of 
expressing clear, logical ideas (Freud 1969).
Von Domarus (Arieti 1974) synthesized a theory on the uniquely 
delusional components of schizophrenic primary process as evidenced in 
verbal expression. He dichotomized secondary and primary process into 
two new categories designed to elucidate differences contained in their 
respective logical assumptions. Secondary process is associated with 
Aristotelian logic, which clearly defines the admissible steps for gen­
erating true conclusions from a set of antecedent statements in the
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form of syllogism. Paleologic, by contrast, is not bound by external 
criteria for developing assumptions about the world; in this instance 
the progression of thought will be highly personal and idiosyncratic.
An example of such a personalized and extraordinary reasoning progres­
sion is cited in the statement of a patient: "the Virgin Mary was a 
virgin; I am a virgin; therefore, I am the Virgin Mary." A more 
succinct and conclusive way of describing the reasoning flaw in the 
pseudo syllogism is to call it a confusion of predicates. Specifi­
cally, whereas a normal person will accept identity only on the basis 
of identical subjects, the schizophrenic will tend to conclude identity 
on the basis of identical predicates. Consequently, schizophrenics 
will take paths to conclusions very different from those followed by 
normals capable of standard logical operations in their daily lives. 
However, von Domarus noted that the paleologic of the schizophrenic is 
susceptible to analysis if the listener is willing to suspend logical, 
sequential processes and attempt a more global, metaphoric appreciation. 
In the example of the Virgin Mary cited above, the patient's therapist 
was able to help her when he was able to understand her need to identify 
with Mary as a symbol of human perfection. It should be noted in pass­
ing that von Domarus assigned the name of paleologic to schizophrenic 
verbal contents because of an implicit assumption that psychotic 
thought was akin to that of aboriginal man.
It has long been assumed that a relationship exists between the 
schizophrenic error of equating predicates and the poet's skill in 
creating interesting and fresh metaphor. Both were said to permit pri­
mary process thought to rise to a dominant position in the life of the 
adult individual. It has been argued that the products of the poet
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(artist, musician) are easily distinguished from those of the schizo­
phrenic in terms of the level of discipline that the poet employs in 
expressing primary process material. Whereas there may be considerable 
similarity between the poet's and the schizophrenic's skill in acces­
sing primary process material, the two are thought to differ radically 
in their ability to make sense of instinct-laden thought and then to 
communicate it to others. The poet is successful to the extent that he 
can generate highly affective material and then communicate this affect 
to a broad audience through the use of metaphor and connotative 
language. The schizophrenic, by contrast, is unable to integrate, 
organize or communicate the intense affect such that others can readily 
share in his experience. His inner experience is said to be autistic 
and highly idiosyncratic; it is discernible only to the person who is 
able to decipher its personal meanings and paleologic. Some current 
psychoanalytic theorists describe the creative event as necessarily 
involving two separate cognitive phenomena: first, the fluent genera­
tion of primary process material in any and all forms, and, secondly, 
the subjection of these thought contents to reality-oriented secondary 
process. It is the latter step that saves the whole experience from 
being autistic, overly personalized or narcissistic (Suler 1980).
Ernst Kris (1952) understood the successful creative act as a 
genuinely healing or self-enhancing activity. He described the creative 
act as a form of adaptive regression, or "a regression in the service 
of the ego"; he believed that optimal mental health required periodic 
loosening of the strictures of adult logic in hopes of expanding one's 
awareness through the exercise of latent primitive or childlike 
capacities. Whereas the risks of total capitulation to primary process
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might be psychotic decompensation, the complete adherence to secondary 
process could lead to characterological rigidity, emotional insensi­
tivity, empty ritual and lack of humor.
During the 1950's and 60's the distinction between adaptive and 
maladaptive regression gained currency in psychological circles, and 
this, in turn, generated interest in the assessment and measurement of 
primary process. Traditional projective tests such as the TAT or 
Rorschach were logical choices for this task because of their capacity 
to elicit material in an open-ended, unrestricted fashion. Research 
projects attempting to establish the reliability and validity of 
various techniques began to multiply. One of the more successful 
efforts in the measurement of primary process was that of Robert Holt 
(1956, 1966, 1970) who developed a means of distinguishing adaptive and 
maladaptive primary process using the Rorschach Inkblot Test. Basi­
cally, Holt developed a technique to evaluate two aspects of primary 
process: 1) the extent to which a response is drive-dominated (or
suggestive of sexual and/or aggressive meaning) and, 2) the degree to 
which the response accommodates to the demands of external social 
reality. His goal was to identify three main groups of persons accord­
ing to their Rorschach response tendencies. In ascending order of 
research interest, these were 1) persons whose dominant mode of 
response is through the use of secondary process and who show virtually 
no evidence of drive-dominated material, 2) persons who make heavy use 
of drive-laden material but whose attempts to make their responses 
socially acceptable are ineffective; members of this group typically 
show considerable perceptual distortion and often exhibit psychotic
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tendencies, 3) persons who produce a generous amount of drive-laden 
content but who are able to mold their responses into socially appro­
priate form.
Intensive research activity has centered on the personal charac­
teristics of individuals in the third group because of the presumed 
adaptive use of primary process. In Kris's language, one would expect 
this group to best manifest "regression in the service of the ego." 
Studies in the areas of creativity (Pine and Holt 1960), level of 
developmental maturity (Wulach 1977) , and positive effects of psycho­
therapy (Fishman 1973) have supported hypotheses that subjects with high 
adaptive regression scores will also show more originality, fluency, 
creativity, maturity, flexibility and willingness to attempt personal 
change. Research on hypnosis has had mixed results; highly susceptible 
psychotic subjects have shown significantly higher adpative regression 
scores than nonsusceptible psychotics, but normal subjects have shown 
no difference with respect to adaptive regression (Lavoie, Sabourin,
Ally and Langois 1976; Fromm, Oberlander and Gruenwald 1970).
Holt (1960) did a study examining the relationship between primary 
process and interference on the Stroop Word Color Interference Test. 
Using normal subjects, Holt discovered that persons showing little 
interference on the WCIT tended to give Rorschach responses manifesting 
a significantly greater amount of primary process than persons 
experiencing high interference. Holt also found that persons showing 
high interference on the WCIT tended to give a paucity of primary 
process content in their Rorschach protocols; however, he noted consid­
erable squirming and nervous laughing during administration of the 
Rorschach, suggesting greater discomfort in dealing with their primary
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process thought. This observation is consistent with other research 
suggesting more maturity and greater cognitive and affective differ­
entiation in subjects registering high adaptive regression scores on the 
Rorschach. Following Werner's formulation, one could speculate that 
greater impact of affect suggests more concrete processing of percepts, 
or, in the extreme case, loss of separation between real objects and 
percepts. For example, if a vulva is seen on one of the Rorschach 
cards, greater embarrassment and interruption of cognition would occur 
in a person for whom inkblots become confused with real objects.
Although such events are usually restricted to psychotic subjects, they 
are not terribly rare. Holt provided the following affect-laden 
response in his manual: "Oh what a disgusting beetle; looks like he's 
coming at you; take it away, please!"
In the area of linguistics, the deficient performance of schizo­
phrenics on the WCIT has already been cited by some theorists as 
evidence for merger of referent with symbol. It will be recalled that 
this explanation was used to account for longer latencies in the 
responses of schizophrenic subjects to stimulus color names printed in 
discrepant colors. Conversely, this explanation would maintain that 
short latencies on the WCIT suggest skill at keeping referents and 
symbols separate and, hence, greater cognitive maturity. Perhaps, also, 
the analogous process of keeping Rorschach percept separate from actual 
object permits the mature person (i.e. one who uses adaptive primary 
process) to report instinct-laden percepts without experiencing disabl­
ing inhibition. If it is true that the phenomenon of inhibition on the 
Rorschach and on the WCIT has a common source, then one might expect 
analogous disruption of phonetic symbol decoding among persons showing
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little adaptive use of primary process. Conversely, persons with ready 
access to adaptive regression should be superior in decoding phonetic 
symbols. It will be recalled that the Color Phonetic Symbol Test 
showed results parallel to those obtained on the WCIT when performance 
of schizophrenic and normal subjects was compared.
Psychodynamic theorists outside of the Freudian tradition have 
developed theoretical dichotomies similar to the primary/secondary 
process distinction made in classical psychoanalysis. For example, in 
the analytical psychology of Carl Jung, a typology of polar opposites 
is discussed, and persons are classed according to their placement on 
three typological continua, whose are the following: thinking-feeling, 
introversion-extraversion, intuition-sensation. The last of these 
continua, intuition-sensation, is the closest analog to the primary/ 
secondary process dichotomy in Freudian psychology, since, for Jung, 
intuition represents one's skill at accessing the contents of the un­
conscious (i.e.,, instinctual, primary process thought) and sensation 
refers to one's capacity to use his five senses to understand the 
outer world. Presumably, sensation is more akin to secondary process 
thought in that both require sequential, contiguous processing of 
information; both are rigorous, step-by-step operations. Intuition, by 
contrast, can violate sequential order by leaping ahead to a conclu­
sion when a critical number of elements in a problem bears a similarity 
to a previously encountered situation.
A personality test based on Jungian type theory was developed by 
Myers in 1962. This test, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) has 
been used extensively in various areas of psychological research, and 
moderately strong evidence supporting the validity and reliability of
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the MBTI has been generated. Carlyn (1977) summarized the existing 
experimental literature on the MBTI dealing with the issues of internal 
consistency, stability, content validity, predictive validity and 
construct validity; she concluded that the MBTI is an "adequately 
reliable self-report inventory . . . measuring dimensions of personal­
ity which seem to be quite similar to those postulated by Carl Jung." 
With respect to research in creativity, Richter and Winter (1966) found 
that highly creative subjects (so judged by virtue of their high 
intuition scores) gave significantly more responses containing definite 
form, color, movement, human content and abstract content on the 
Holtzman Inkblot Test than did subjects rated as low on creativity; 
these inkblot test indices are also regarded as correlates of sponta­
neity, maturity and complex cognition. In a study analyzing skill in 
interpreting emotional expression in photographs, Carlson and Levy 
(1973) found that intuitive types were significantly more accurate than 
sensing types.
Carlson and Levy's finding points to an adjunct area of interest 
to the present study, namely the relationship between interpersonal 
sensitivity and skill in accessing linguistic/phonetic universals. It 
has long been assumed that interpersonal sensitivity, or empathy, is an 
attribute of persons who are most in touch with their unconscious proc­
esses— or high intuitors, in the Jungian conceptualization. Carlson 
and Levy's study suggests support for this notion, but it would be use­
ful to see if other indices of empathy also relate to strong intuition 
function. The nature of empathy has been variously described by 
writers to mean either a highly primitive function witch communicates 
emotion through a process of contagion or a more sophisticated
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cognitive function which "reads" persons from a distance (Mehrabian and 
Epstein 1972; Feffer and Suchotliff 1966). Do either of these empathic 
mechanisms correlate with nativist apprehension of meaning in human 
speech sound? If so, perhaps the understanding of the- nature of 
empathy must be broadened to include a previously unappreciated 
linguistic component.
The relationship between intuition and primitive word meanings was 
explored in a dissertation by Adair (1974). Using the intuition- 
sensation subscale of the MBTI he identified subjects who fell at the 
extremes on this continuum. All subjects were instructed to give free 
associations to neutral, ordinary English words such as pencil and fire. 
These responses were then rated for their latent archaic content by 
independent judges. Adair found that subjects high on intuition gave 
significantly more archaic and instinct-laden responses than did sub­
jects low on intuition. If the MBTI proved to be useful in selecting 
persons with ready access to primitive meanings of English words, 
perhaps it could also differentiate persons with skill at decoding 
phonetic symbols. This hypothesis would assume that Adair's task 
initiated a regressive process which drove linguistic evolution back­
wards, tapping into complexes of phonetic universals which could 
probably have been simplified to even more basic semantic components.
STUDIES IN HEMISPHERE ASYMMETRY:
LANGUAGE AND AFFECT
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that human neuro­
physiology is reflective of the dichotomy between primary process 
thought (intuition) and secondary process thought (sensation); this 
research concerns itself with the phenomenon of asymmetry of function
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between the two cerebral hemispheres. In general, investigators have 
discovered that the left hemisphere specializes in verbal, analytic and 
logical thought; whereas, the right provides a more global, aesthetic, 
spatial and emotional cognitive function (Kimura 1973; Benton and Van 
Allen 1968; Nebes 1974).
Until recently, it had been assumed that the left hemisphere has 
total control of human language function; this was believed to encom­
pass language in both its spoken and written forms. Parenthetically, 
it is necessary here to specify that this discussion relates to the 
vast majority of the population who are right-handed; left-handers are 
somewhat more variable in terms of dominance for language function, but 
a clear majority of them show left hemisphere control of language 
(Hecaen and Sauget 1971).
Several sources of evidence have been used as support for the 
dominance of language in the left hemisphere. One major corpus of 
evidence, which is continually corroborated through neurological and 
neurophyshological assessment of brain damage, is the brain lesion 
research. Very early on, it was noted that the incidence of language 
deficit with damage to the left hemisphere was 70 percent; in cases of 
right hemisphere damage, incidence drops to one or two percent (Penfield 
and Roberts 1959; Russell and Espir 1961). Another well documented 
reference for left hemisphere language comes from research using the 
Wada test, a rather hazardous anesthetization of either hemisphere by 
injection of sodium amytal into the ipsilateral carotid artery; this 
has been done as a means to establish language localization prior to 
surgery. It has been found that left carotid injection interrupts 
speech in 90 percent of right-handers tested and that only 10 percent
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experience disruption when administered sodium amytal on the right 
(Branch, Milner and Rasmussen 1964)• With respect to surgical evi­
dence, until very recently, researchers have reported that patients who 
have experienced isolation of the left hemisphere, either through 
disconnection of the hemispheres (commissurotomy) or through actual 
removal of the right hemisphere (hemispherectomy), show normal or near 
normal language function (Gazzaniga 1970; Smith 1974).
Two means of studying the intact normal subject have been through 
experimental methods using dichotic and split field techniques. In 
dichotic listening research, competing messages are introduced to the 
two ears of normal subjects; the typical finding is a right ear advan­
tage. Since 60 percent of the auditory neurons cross to the contra­
lateral side, a right ear advantage implicates left hemisphere 
processing (Kimura 1967; Studdert-Kennedy et al. 1972). In the visual 
modality, input can be addressed separately to the two hemispheres by 
means of split field technique; this method requires presenting stimuli 
via tachistoscope in order to prevent lateral eye movements. Verbal 
material has consistently been more readily recognized in the left 
hemisphere than in the right (McKeever and Huling 1971; Moscovitch 
1976). An interesting difference between split field and dichotic 
studies relates to the neurophysiology of crossing nerve tracts to the 
contralateral side; whereas, 60 percent of the pathways for audition 
are contralaterally registered, a full 100 percent crossover occurs in 
split field visual studies.
Evidence for the unique contribution of the right hemisphere to 
language capacity involves a much more recent and more circumscribed 
body of literature. Filskov and Boll (1981) have made an interesting
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distinction between the left hemisphere's analytic functions and the 
right hemisphere's pragmatic functions. They understand pragmatics to 
involve the use of a system of rules that explicate the appropriate 
utilization of language in a particular situational context. These 
authors offer the example of a pragmatics problem in a person's response 
to the question, "Can you pass the salt?" To respond by answering 
"yes" and then failing actually to pass the salt would exemplify a 
correct grammatical, left hemisphere response but an incorrect solution 
to the right hemisphere pragmatics of the situation; in effect, the 
person would have dealt with the surface structure of the sentence 
without appreciating it as a request. Such errors are prevalent in 
persons sustaining damage to the right hemisphere.
Studies of persons with right hemisphere damage report evidence 
that is consistent with Filskov and Boll's notion of pragmatics. For 
example, Gardner and Denes (1973) tested right hemisphere patients who 
were unable to comprehend the use of common metaphors (e.g., "He was 
wearing a loud tie.") because of an overriding concreteness and liter­
alism. Difficulty in appreciating humor and in choosing the correct 
sequence for a story arrangement task was noted by Wapner et al.
(1981). Caramazza et al. (1976) reported that persons with right 
hemisphere damage showed significantly worse performance in comprehend­
ing verbally expressed visuospatial relationships. Taken together, 
these findings offer support for the role of the right hemisphere as 
the interpreter of metaphor, interpersonal context and spatial relation­
ships. In addition, the pragmatism to which Filskov and Boll refer 
points to an important executive function which synthesizes the surface 
verbal input into a richer and more interpersonally appropriate
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message. The pragmatically correct response to the question, "Can you 
pass the salt?" implies an affective and empathic component which 
effectively translates the question to its intended form (i.e. , of a 
request) and knows automatically to disregard its surface representa­
tion. Although Chomsky (1980) was primarily concerned with other kinds 
of syntactical issues when he proposed the idea of deep structure, it 
would seem appropriate to consider the possibility of structural 
invariance underlying the rules of right hemisphere pragmatics.
Adair's (1974) dissertation study of archaic word meanings 
employed a hemisphere asymmetry manipulation in addition to the already 
mentioned intuition-sensation dichotomy. He discovered that monaural 
presentation of stimulus words yielded significantly more primitive 
responses when introduced to the left ear than to the right. Since 60 
percent neural crossover occurs in audition, the majority of the stimu­
lus material was registered in the contralateral hemisphere. Therefore, 
the right hemisphere produced more primitive responses. This finding 
is consistent with the pragmatics literature to the extent that the 
right hemisphere engaged material that was affectively tagged because 
of its unique semantic evolution. Perhaps, in a similar fashion, the 
right hemisphere would have more ready access to even more archaic 
contents in the form of phonetic symbols.
In addition to these linguistically based studies supporting right 
hemisphere mediation of affect, several recent studies point to a 
general dependence on right hemisphere control of affective expression 
and comprehension. Examples of these appear in Tucker's (1981) mono­
graph on laterality, cognition and emotion; experimental evidence was 
cited on brain damaged and neurologically intact populations. In
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general, findings from studies on subjects with right hemisphere 
lesions suggest deficits in judging emotional mood of a speaker, com­
municating of affect through tone of voice, or comprehending facial 
expression of emotion (Heilman et al. 1975; Tucker et al. 1976; Cicone 
et al. 1979). A sampling of research on normal subjects revealed 
consistent left lateral eye movements in the presence of emotional 
stimulation and left ear superiority for the judgment of a speaker's 
tone of voice; both of these findings implicate right hemisphere proc­
essing (Tucker et al. 1977; Safer and Leventhal 1977).
THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study attempts to reexamine many of the issues which 
have continued to spark controversy in the fields of linguistics and 
psychology. Specifically, it is directed at the question of inherent 
meaning in human speech sound. It is proposed that many of the issues 
raised in the phonetic symbolism research may be susceptible to further 
study using adaptations of psychodynamic and organismic developmental 
theories. Extensions of the research of Langer, Holt, Adair and others 
are joined to explore the general hypothesis that more direct apprehen­
sion of phonetic symbols should be related to more ready access to 
primary process thought. A closely related hypothesis considers the 
notion that intuitive interpersonal sensitivity entails ready access to 
primary process and the ability to decode archaic meanings.
The possibility of primitive meanings in the phoneme is to be 
examined using a number of research strategies. The Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI) has been used effectively in the past as a screening 
device to identify persons at the extremes on attributes such as
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creativity, accuracy in judging emotional expression and ability to 
appreciate primitive or instinctual content in common English words 
(Richter and Winter 1966; Carlson and Levy 1973; Adair 1974). All 
three of these areas would appear to reflect skill in adaptive regres­
sion, and the Adair study on primitive meanings may logically constitute 
a subset in the larger research concern of phonetic universals. 
Consequently,- the MBTI will be used as a preliminary screening 
instrument to select subjects from a large pool to represent extremes 
on the intuition— sensation dimension.
Related to the notion of intuition in the study of phonetic 
universals is a set of nativist assumptions held in common with Gestalt 
psychology concerning the perceiving of wholes or a priori forms. The 
skill of an individual to appreciate pragnanz, or the quality of whole­
ness in a visual stimulus array, has been examined using a variety of 
instruments inspired by Gestalt psychology. Most of these tests require 
the subject to guess what is portrayed in degraded or incomplete stimu­
lus pictures. In an early effort by Street (1931) a test was developed 
which consisted of a set of degraded pictures of common objects such 
as telephones, railroad engines, etc. A more recent test by Mooney 
(1957) used ambiguous human faces as stimulus items. The latter test 
is probably an improvement over Street's set of items simply because of 
its use of more phylogenetically relevant stimulus material; it will be 
recalled that Fantz (1958) demonstrated the presence of unique and 
arousing stimulus properties in the human face. Within the context of 
clinical neuropsychology, Lansdell (1968) has used the Mooney faces 
task to assist in diagnosis of right hemisphere lesion; clinical experi­
ence documenting a host of deficits in the perception of synthesized
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wholes (e.g., constructional dyspraxia, prosopagnosia, etc.) resulting 
from right hemisphere damage justified the use of this task. If poor 
performance on the Mooney faces is suggestive of impaired right hemi­
sphere function, then, by extension, better performance on this task 
would imply superior right hemisphere function, particularly in the 
processing of whole percepts. To the extent that phonetic symbols 
represent a priori percepts of linguistic meaning, the Mooney task 
would appear to be a good candidate to discriminate persons according 
to skill in the apprehension of linguistic a priori. Adequacy of right 
hemisphere function is also a correlate of accurate comprehension of 
affective and interpersonal contextual cues of linguistic material 
(Wapner et al. 1981). For these reasons, the Mooney task will be used 
in the present study as a measure of right hemisphere perceptual skill.
A further effort to tap right hemisphere linguistic function will 
build on the findings of Adair (1974) which are suggestive of a role 
for the right hemisphere in the appreciation of unconscious meaning of 
standard English words. His technique involved the direct introduction 
of stimulus material to either hemisphere using the auditory channel 
via the contralateral ear. Although he achieved significant results 
using this technique, it is important to note that in audition studies 
there can only be 60 percent concentration in one hemisphere because 
the neural pathway splits to permit ipsilateral as well as contra­
lateral registration of auditory stimuli (Noback and Demarest 1972) .
The present study will attempt a modification of Adair's methodology in 
order to increase the concentration of stimuli transmitted to the oppo­
site side hemisphere. This will be accomplished through substitution 
of a visual split field design for the unilateral aural presentation
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method. Visual split field studies do assure 100 percent crossover to 
the hemisphere contralateral to the site of stimulation.
A fourth manipulation will involve use of the Rorschach Inkblot 
Test following the scoring protocol developed by Holt (1970). A large 
body of research supports this system as a reliable method to distin­
guish primary from secondary process cognition and, perhaps of greater 
interest, adaptive from maladaptive use of primary process. Evidence 
for the adequacy of this system has been cited in diverse research 
areas, including hypnotic susceptibility, positive response to psycho­
therapy, and in developmental research (Fromm et al. 1970; Fishman 
1973 and Wulach 1977). Also cited above is evidence for a strong 
relationship between cognitive flexibility (as seen in performance on 
the Word Color Interference Test) and readiness of access to primary 
process (Holt 1960). It is suggested in the present study that greater 
cognitive flexibility and more adaptive use of primary process should 
enhance performance on a phonetic symbol task.
The second major area of investigation in the present study relates 
to the attribute of interpersonal sensitivity, or empathy. This attri­
bute is frequently regarded as an intuitive skill which is essential 
for the maintenance of effective interpersonal relationships. On a 
very basic level, such sensitivity can be reflected in a susceptibility 
for "infection" of the feeling state of another. More sophisticated 
signs of interpersonal sensitivity can be seen in one's ability to 
discern the emotional import of facial expression, posture, etc., with­
out being swept into the experience of affect. An attempt to tap both 
of these predispositions will be made. Primitive or contagious 
interpersonal sensitivity will be measured using an empathy inventory
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designed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). Sophisticated interpersonal 
sensitivity will be evaluated using an adaptation of research materials 
taken from the work of Ekman and Friesen (1975). The latter investi­
gators discovered robust cross-cultural consistency in the decoding of 
emotional content in human facial expression.
The experimental hypotheses are as follows: 1) high intuition/ 
perception (as assessed by the MBTI) will show significant, positive 
correlation with phonetic symbol performance; 2) performance on the 
Mooney visual gestalt task will be significantly related to phonetic 
symbol test scores; 3) adaptive primary process on the Rorschach Inkblot 
Test will show significant and positive correlation with apprehension 
of phonetic symbols; 4) high interpersonal sensitivity and empathy will 
be associated with skill in decoding phonetic symbols; 5) the correla­
tion between the percentage of total correct phonetic symbol responses 
registering in the right hemisphere and the total number of correct 
responses will be significant and positive.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
An initial subject pool consisted of 383 undergraduate psychology 
students (126 male and 257 female) at the University of North Dakota. 
This group was administered the Intuition-Sensation and Judgment- 
Perception scales of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). All of 
these subjects were right-handed. The Judgment-Perception dimension 
of the MBTI does not correspond with any of the original Jungian typo­
logical theoretical notions; nonetheless, studies have consistently 
found significant correlations between this scale and the Intuition- 
Sensation scale; the latter scale was designed to discriminate persons 
who consult their inner motivations from persons who utilize sensation 
as a means to arrive at life decisions (Carlyn 1977). Because of the 
moderately high relationship between these two scales, which ranges as 
high as .50 in some studies, it was decided to use them in concert to 
identify individuals high and low on a composite intuition/perception 
attribute. Persons were defined as high intuitors if they achieved 
scores greater than one standard deviation above the mean on the 
Intuition-Sensation subscale; similarly, persons achieving scores lower 
than one standard below the mean were defined as low intuitors. To be 
included in the experiment, high intuitors were also required to obtain 
a Perception-Judgment score above the mean (i.e., in the direction of
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perception); low intuitors were required to score below the mean.
There were 84 persons (34 males and 50 females) so selected who agreed 
to continue participation in the study.
Procedure
Preliminary Session. Subjects were screened a second time using 
a modification of Mooney's (1957) gestalt closure task. A booklet 
containing 24 of Mooney's original test items was prepared and distrib­
uted to each subject. These test items are human faces which are 
difficult, to discern because they are shown in ambiguous figure-ground 
relationship. A test answer sheet accompanied the faces booklet, and 
test instructions required the subject to identify each face by sex, 
age (child, adult or aged person) and direction facing. Subjects were 
given 13 minutes to complete this task (see Appendices A and B).
Following completion of the Mooney task, subjects received another 
booklet containing human face stimulus items. In this instance, how­
ever, each face was a distinct photograph rather than an ambiguous 
figure-ground image. The 60 photographs were designed by Ekman and 
Friesen (1975) to portray emotions of various kinds and in varying 
degrees of subtlety. For each picture the subject was asked to select 
a best choice for a matching emotion from four alternatives. Ekman's 
standards were adopted for norms (see Appendices C and D). No time 
limit was set for the Ekman task.
A third piece of data was collected from subjects at this time in 
the form of an emotional empathy scale designed by Mehrabian and 
Epstein (1972). This is an inventory of 33 items which attempts to 
measure a person's capacity for affective appreciation of another's
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feelings. Each item is set on an eight point scale, and the direction 
of low-to-high score is randomly reversed throughout (see Appendix E).
The second experimental screening session ended as subjects 
returned their completed forms for the three tasks described above. 
Persons already having been designated as "high" on the MBTI were 
retained in the study if they achieved a score greater than +.5 standard 
deviation on the Mooney faces task. In addition, those already having 
been designated as "low" on the MBTI were retained if they scored below 
-.5 standard deviation on the Mooney task. Twenty-four subjects meet­
ing these criteria agreed to continue into the final phase of the 
study. Of the female subjects, five received high scores on both the 
MBTI and the Mooney, while eight received low scores on both tasks.
For males, eight were high on both measures, and three were low on both.
Final Session— Part A . Each person was called back for individual 
testing for the final phase of the experiment. During the first part 
of this session subjects were administered an abbreviated version of 
the Rorschach Inkblot Test, which contained cards II, III, IV, VI and 
VIII. These cards were chosen because it was felt that they would have 
high potential to dislodge primary process thought. Half protocols 
were used in order to avoid obtaining an unwieldy amount of data from 
the more verbal subjects. It was felt that this modification would 
permit expedient and efficient collection of data without seriously 
damaging the validity of the procedure within the confines of the 
experiment.
The generally accepted method of Rorschach test administration was 
employed in this experiment. The examiner and the subject were seated 
side-by-side, and every effort was made to minimize the influence of
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the examiner on the subject's responses to each blot. The subject was 
asked to give free association to each card in turn and then to clarify 
each of his initial responses in an inquiry directed by the examiner; 
this is fairly standard procedure.
A slight innovation was introduced by Holt (1970) for the purpose 
of eliciting additional affective expression from subjects. This con­
sisted simply of asking the subject at the close of each inquiry whether 
the percept was pleasant or unpleasant. Holt's method of gauging 
primary process in Rorschach responses involved a two-part process of 
analysis which considers both the demand for defense (DD) of the 
response and the effectiveness of the defense (DE). Demand for defense 
is a rough measure of the shock value of the response or the degree to 
which the underlying idea requires some defensive activity to make the 
response socially acceptable. In other words, the libidinal or aggres­
sive content of the response is sufficiently blunt that it would need 
a contextual reframing to reduce the shock value. An example of such 
a reframing might be the transformation of the sentence, "It looks like 
male genitals sticking out in front" to the form, "Sort of like a 
classical statue of one of the Greek gods; there are his muscular legs, 
his genitals." Defense effectiveness is a measure of the success with 
which the subject limits the instinctual impact of a response by chan­
neling it into a socially acceptable expression. The DE score is 
affected by the basic form level, the expressed affect (inappropriately 
positive or negative) and other systematized measures of control and 
defense. A summated product score, £(DD x DE), gives a general index 
of the adaptiveness of a particular subject's use of primary process 
material. It will be immediately apparent that medium range product
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scores could result from either DD or DE being high and the other 
member being low.
Holt proposed to alleviate this ambiguity by dividing the summated 
product score, £(DD x DE), by the total number of responses containing 
primary process material (abbreviated as //PPR). The resulting expres­
sion, E(DD x DE)/#PPR, came to be known as the adaptive regression score 
and was used as the measure of mature and creative access to instinc­
tual cognitive contents. Subsequently, other forms of adaptive 
regression scores have been suggested, and each one has stressed a 
slightly different aspect of the Rorschach data. For example, some 
researchers prefer to use a quotient involving the percentage, rather 
than the number, of primary process responses, believing that the 
original quotient would underrepresent persons generating short records 
and overrepresent very talkative individuals. Here the resulting 
expression is £(DD x DE)/%PPR. A third adaptive regression quotient 
relates the summated product to the total value of primary process in 
a protocol. (Holt's system assigns a PPR value to each response rang­
ing from zero to five.) The resulting expression in this case is 
£(DD x DE)/TPPR. Finally, a fourth quotient score has been proposed 
which relates the summed product to the quotient of #PPR/%PPR; the 
expression, E(DD x DE)///PPR * %PPR, is yet another attempt to correct 
for the fluency of a protocol.
The last adaptive regression measure used in this study is a com­
posite score suggested by Goldberger (Holt 1970). It was proposed as 
a means to emphasize the relative contributions of DD and DE within the 
experimental sample. The steps to derive the score are as follows:
1) Rank all subjects from high to low according to percent primary
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process (%PPR) in a protocol, assigning the highest percentage a rank 
of one; 2) rank all subjects from high to low according to the effec­
tiveness of defense (DE) in the total protocol, assigning the protocol 
with the highest proportion of DE a rank of one; 3) split each of these 
rankings in half. Identify subjects who fall in the upper halves of 
both distributions (%PPR and DE), and label these subjects "mature," 
assigning them a composite score of four. Subjects falling in the 
lower half of the %PPR distribution but in the upper half of the DE 
distribution are labelled "rigid but with good control"; they are 
assigned a composite score of three. People low on both %PPR and DE 
are labelled "rigid but with breakthroughs" and are given a score of 
two. Those who are in the upper half of the distribution on %PPR but 
in the lower half of the DE distribution are designated "poorly con­
trolled" and are given a score of one.
In the interests of clarity and simplicity, the five adaptive 
regression measures described above will be relabelled to spare the 
reader confusion in interpreting the results. The chief concern with 
respect to the Rorschach indices is to appreciate the distinction 
between scores indicating nonspecific primary process (e.g. #PPR, %PPR) 
and scores indicating adaptive primary process. The following labels 
will be assigned to the adaptive primary process measures just 
described:
Ad. Reg. 1 will refer to the score, E(DD x DE)/#PPR;
Ad. Reg. 2 will refer to the score, £(DD x DE)/%PPR;
Ad. Reg. 3 will refer to the score, E(DD x DE)/TPPR;
Ad. Reg. 4 will refer to the score, E(DD x DE)/#PPR t %PPR;
Ad. Reg. 5 will be the label of Goldberger's composite ranking.
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This simplification will permit the reader to identify immediately cor­
relates associated with mature and successful use of primary process.
All of the above indices were subsequently determined by two 
independent raters using Holt's 1970 manual. Inter-rater agreement was 
high and is reported in the Results chapter of this dissertation.
Final Session-Part B. Following administration of the Rorschach 
Inkblot Test, subjects were invited to the room containing experimental 
apparatus for the final phase of data collection. Subjects were seated 
before a Gerbrands T-2B-1C tachistoscope, and a set of instructions 
were read explaining the experimental task (see Appendix F). Briefly, 
subjects were told that they should associate color meanings to pro­
nounceable nonwords which would be flashed on the right or left half of 
the viewing field of the tachistoscope. They were asked to limit their 
color associations to three options: red, green or blue. They were 
reminded at regular intervals to consider only these choices in the 
performance of the exercise, and each reminder varied the order of the 
three choices (blue, green, red; red, blue, green, etc.).
The nonword stimulus items were those used by Langer and his 
associates in their extensive research on phonetic symbolism (see 
Introduction). Appendix G is a listing of these stimulus items.
Langer's norms were accepted to determine expected high frequencies of 
association for various stimulus items. Only those items which were 
shown to be strong associates to the colors red, green or blue were 
used as test items; these are designated in Appendix G. Thus, for 
example, a subject's response, "red," to the appearance of ZAH on the 
tachistoscope screen constituted a correct phonetic symbol match. The 
balance of the items formed an imbedding medium for the target test
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items, in that Langer's research suggests no strong preference for 
color association for any of these remaining sound complexes. Hence, 
there were 14 target items randomly intermixed among 11 unscored, non­
target items. The order of appearance in the left or right visual 
field was determined by a table of random numbers, and this order was 
then reversed in order to give equal visual field exposure to all 
stimulus materials. Thus there were 28 scored items for each subject, 
14 on the right and 14 on the left.
As Appendix F indicates, subjects were instructed to prepare them 
selves for each stimulus exposure by fixating gaze on an "x" in the 
center of a prestimulus field. The experimenter then triggered expo­
sure of the stimulus item for 200 milliseconds. This fairly standard 
split-field research procedure helps to minimize lateral eye movement 
and the consequent registration of stimuli in both hemispheres 
simultaneously.
Subjects responded orally with a color association to each item, 
and these were recorded by the experimenter. The latency of each 
response was measured by a millisecond timer which was attached to a 
voice response time control and a microphone placed before the subject 
This latency score was recorded along with the associated color 
response.
At the close of the color phonetic symbol task described above, 
subjects were asked to complete a form which contained 12 of the stimu 
lus items which they had just viewed on the tachistoscope. They were 
asked to recall the color choices they had assigned to each of the 
phonetic symbol nonwords and to write the color name in the space 
adjacent to the nonword. In addition, they were asked to rate their
confidence in the correctness of each of their choices on a scale of 
one to five. A variant of the latter manipulation was used in a study 
by Koriat (1975), in which a significant relationship was found between 
a subject's level of confidence in his guess of the meaning of a 
foreign word and his accuracy in guessing the word. It was felt that 
this measure might relate to other indices of intuition, or "feeling 
of knowing," as Koriat called it. Lastly, subjects were directed to 
indicate on their form the foreign languages they had studied (or 
spoken) and the total number of years of exposure to each language. No 
hypothesis was offered regarding the possible facilitation such foreign 
language usage might have on phonetic symbol decoding.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
A total of 383 subjects were administered the Intuition-Sensation 
and Judgment-Perception subscales of the MBTI. The following parame­
ters were obtained from the MBTI data: mean = 95.52, standard 
deviation = 24.84, range = 37-151.
Eighty-four people (34 males and 50 females) were selected for 
inclusion in the second round of experimental screening. The criterion 
for continuation in the study was the achievement of an MBTI Intuition 
score which fell either above plus one standard deviation or below 
minus one standard deviation; an additional inclusion criterion 
required the subject's Perception score to fall above or below the mean 
in the same direction as the intuition score.
It was thought potentially useful to observe changes or consist­
encies in patterns of correlations when a more extreme separation 
between high and low intuiting subjects is applied. For this reason, 
two levels of observation using the intuition screening criterion are 
reported in Tables 2a and b and 3a and b. At the more stringent level 
of separation, high intuiting subjects received MBTI intuition scores 
greater than plus 1.75 standard deviations, and low intuiting subjects 
scored below minus 1.75 standard deviations.
During the second session, the Mooney Faces test, the Ekman Faces 
test and the Mehrabian Emotional Empathy test were administered. Means
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and standard deviations, respectively, are reported as follows: 
Mooney, 54.08, 5.14; Ekman, 39.32, 4.07; Mehrabian, 184.70, 20.29. 
Correlations for the MBTI, Mooney, Ekman and Mehrabian data appear in 
Table 1.
TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS AMONG MBTI, MOONEY, EKMAN AND MEHRABIAN VARIABLES
MBTI Mooney Ekman Mehrabian
MBTI 1.000
Mooney .161 1.000
Ekman - .071 .138 1.000
Mehrabian - .023 .150 .046 1.000
Following the second session of data collection, the Mooney task 
was scored and was used to screen subjects for participation in the 
final phase of the experiment. Persons achieving scores greater than 
plus .5 standard deviation or less than minus .5 standard deviation 
were called back for the third and final experimental session.
The final phase of data collection consisted of completion of the 
abbreviated Rorschach Inkblot Test and participation in the visually 
lateralized phonetic symbol task. Independent judges scored Rorschach 
protocols of all 24 continuing subjects, and interrater reliability 
coefficients for the various indices are reported as follows: Defense 
Demand (DD), .95; Defense Effectiveness (DE), .90; Number of Primary 
Process Responses (#PPR), .96; Percentage of Responses Containing 
Primary Process (%PPR), .95; Total Value of Primary Process (TPPR), .99.
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These reliability coefficients compared favorably with those reported
i-
in previous studies (McMahon 1964; Bachrach 1968; Allison 1967; Benfari 
and Calogeras 1968; Oberlander 1967; Rabkin 1971; Heath 1965).
During the phonetic symbol task, subjects' responses were recorded 
and were subsequently scored and sorted into various phonetic symbol 
score categories, including 1) the total number of correct phonetic 
symbol responses, 2) the total correct responses registered in the 
right hemisphere (i.e., presented to the left visual field), 3) the 
total correct responses registered in the left hemisphere, and 4) the 
percentage of the grand total of correct responses which resulted from 
stimulation of the right hemisphere. In addition to these measures, 
response latencies were also recorded through the use of a voice acti­
vated timer; however, since no discernible pattern of relationship 
could be noted between correctness of response and latency, the latency 
data are omitted in this section.
Although no formal hypothesis was made regarding the relationship 
between sex and skill at decoding phonetic symbols, it was decided to 
include sex as a variable at the outset rather than to analyze sex dif­
ferences in a post hoc fashion. Sex was scored female = 1 and male =
0; therefore, female gender is strongly associated with a variable if 
the correlation is positive and significant, and male gender is 
indicated if the correlation is negative and significant.
The variable reporting a subject's foreign language experience is 
included to check for possible enhancement effects resulting from such 
exposure.
All experimental data were analyzed using the Pearson Corr routine 
found in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Nie et al.
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1975). Tables 2a and b and 3a and b report resulting correlations 
which either bear directly on the experimental hypotheses or are of 
interest for other reasons. The discussion which follows treats 
experimental hypotheses first and then addresses ancillary findings.
TABLE 2a
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED VARIABLES AND PHONETIC SYMBOL 
SCORES USING INCLUSION CRITERION OF > +1 S.D. OR 
< -1 S.D. ON THE MBTI (N = 24)
Significance Levels Reported in Parentheses (**)
R Hem 
Correct
L Hem 
Correct
% of Total 
Correct 
on R Hem
Total
Correct
MBTI .104 -.062 .101 .013
Mooney .007 -.141 .132 -.082
Ekman -.023 -.093 .098 -.067
Mehrabian -.093 .020 -.130 -.033
#ppr -.277
(.10)
-.192 -.017 -.252
%PPR -.304
(.08)
-.215 -.078 -.278
(.09)
Ad. Reg. .265 .274
(.10)
-.015 .295
(.08)
Sex .130 .294
(.08)
-.252 .245
# Yrs.
For. Lang. 
(N = 22) .246 .070 .063 .163
It was hypothesized that high intuition/perception scores on the 
MBTI would be positively and significantly correlated with phonetic
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symbol performance. Tables 2a and b show no significant correlation 
between any of the phonetic symbol scores and the MBTI intuition/ 
perception measure. Therefore, the data fail to support the hypothe­
sized relationship between intuition and access to phonetic symbols.
TABLE 2b
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED VARIABLES AND PHONETIC SYMBOL 
SCORES USING INCLUSION CRITERION OF > +1.75 S.D. OR
< -1.75 S.D,. ON THE MBTI (N = 15)
Significance Levels Reported in Parentheses (.**)
R Hem 
Correct
L Hem 
Correct
% of Total 
Correct 
on R Hem
Total
Correct
MBIT .091 -.052 .048 .012
Mooney -.114 -.104 -.058 -.121
Ekman -.035 -.089 .055 -.073
Mehrabian .635
(.01)
.367
(.09)
.026 .540
(.02)
#PPR -.298 -.190 -.076 -.265
%PPR -.087 -.144 .021 -.133
Ad. Reg. 4 .057 .278 -.150 .203
Sex .463
(.04)
.542
(.02)
-.286 .616
(.01)
// Yrs.
For. Lang. .279 .079 .054 .185
A second experimental hypothesis predicted a significant relation­
ship between performance on the Mooney visual gestalt task and skill in 
decoding the color phonetic symbols. Again, the data fail to support 
this hypothesized relationship. Tables 2a and b reveal that none of
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TABLE 3a
INTERCORRELATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF PHONETIC SYMBOL 
SCORES USING INCLUSION CRITERION OF > +1 S.D. OR 
< -1 S.D. ON THE MBTI (N = 24)
Significance Levels Reported in Parentheses (.**)
R Hem 
Correct
L Hem 
Correct
% of Total 
Correct 
on R Hem
Total
Correct
R Hem «•
Correct 1.000
L Hem .666 1.000
Correct (.00)
% of Total
Correct on .082 -.659 1.000
R Hem (.00)
Total .891 .932 -.360 1.000
Correct (.00) (.00) (.04)
TABLE 3b
INTERCORRELATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF PHONETIC SYMBOL 
SCORES USING INCLUSION CRITERION OF > +1.75 S.D. OR
< -1.75 S.D,. ON THE MBTI (N = 15)
Significance Levels Reported in Parentheses (.**)
% of Total
R Hem L Hem Correct Total
Correct Correct on R Hem Correct
R Hem 
Correct 1.000
L Hem .595 1.000
Correct (.01)
% of Total 
Correct .060 -.741 1.000
on R Hem (.001)
Total .862 .921 -.438 1.000
Correct (.00) (.00) (.05)
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the four phonetic symbol scores attain significant correlation with the 
Mooney task.
The hypothesized correlation between interpersonal sensitivity and 
skill in accessing phonetic symbols was supported in part. Interest­
ingly, Table 2b reveals that, at the more stringent MBTI level, the 
Mehrabian emotional empathy scale is significantly correlated with the 
total number of correct items occurring with stimulation of the right 
hemisphere. In addition, the correlation between the Mehrabian and the 
number correct with left hemisphere stimulation reached the level of 
trend significance. The Ekman faces task, which provided another gauge 
of interpersonal sensitivity, did not show significant relationship 
with any of the phonetic symbol measures. It will be recalled that the 
Mehrabian was used as an operationally defined index of empathy that is 
primitive and "infectious"; whereas the Ekman was used to measure skill 
in accurate but detached emotional appreciation. To the extent that 
this distinction is valid, one might speculate that primitive empathic 
processes are more akin to the apprehension of phonetic universals than 
are detached empathic processes.
/
The hypothesized relationship between Rorschach adaptive regres­
sion and phonetic symbol skill did not reach significance, but several 
trends toward significance were noted in the data. For example, it 
will be noted that a negative correlation was found between uncontrolled 
primary process (i.e. #PPR and %PPR) and several phonetic symbol 
scores, suggesting a deficit in phonetic symbol apprehension under con­
ditions of randomly expressed primary process. More to the point, the 
correlations between the Ad. Reg. 4 score and the Total Correct and 
Left Hemisphere Correct scores are positive as hypothesized; however,
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the result showing a stronger relationship between adaptive regression 
and left hemisphere response than between adaptive regression and right 
hemisphere score is counter to the original hypothesis.
The hypothesis concerning laterality is addressed more directly 
in an inspection of Tables 3a and b. It was predicted that the corre­
lation between percent of total correct responses channeled to the 
right hemisphere and the total number of correct responses would be 
significant and positive. As can be seen in Tables 3a and b, the 
opposite result was obtained; the correlation between these two varia­
bles is significant and negative. In addition, it is of relevance to 
note that a very high negative correlation was found between the 
percentage of total correct responses on the right and the number of 
correct on the left hemisphere; this should be seen in comparison with 
a lack of correlation between the number of correct responses on the 
right and the percent of total correct responses on the right 
hemisphere. Taken together, these findings would tend to implicate 
left hemisphere superiority in the decoding of phonetic symbol stimuli.
Although no hypotheses were offered regarding sex differences in 
the apprehension of phonetic symbols, the data reveal a significant 
correlation between female gender and phonetic symbol access. This 
relationship was particularly strong at the more stringent level of 
MBTI separation (Table 2b) and was manifested in correlations involving 
both hemispheres and the total number of correct responses. Perhaps 
this finding is a reflection of generally accepted sex differences in 
verbal ability which favor females (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). This 
possibility is discussed in more detail in the next section.
The measure reporting each subject's years of exposure to a
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foreign language failed to achieve significance. This variable was 
included to check for a possible enhancement effect resulting from 
having studied one or more foreign languages. Such enhancement does 
not appear to occur in the present study.
Summary of Results
Hypotheses relating intuition and gestalt closure skill to 
phonetic symbolism were not supported by the data. However, partial 
support was obtained for the predicted relationship between interper­
sonal sensitivity and phonetic symbol skill. While no significant 
correlations between Rorschach adaptive regression and phonetic 
symbolism scores were obtained, trends toward significance were noted 
in several instances. With respect to the hypothesized role of the 
right hemisphere in phonetic symbol decoding, the present results tend 
to contradict this hypothesis and implicate the left hemisphere. An 
unanticipated but highly significant relationship between female gender 
and phonetic symbol access was noted.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Findings Related to Hypotheses
From the outset the general hypothesis of this study has been that 
one's access to phonetic universals is enhanced by an ability to tap 
primitive, instinctual human cognition. In line with this assumption 
a variety of theoretical perspectives and strategies were employed to 
test the correlation between phonetic symbol skill and primitive cogni­
tion. One approach utilized the Jungian typological distinction 
between intuition and sensation, claiming that high intuition should 
correlate with ability to appreciate latent meaning in the phoneme.
This particular hypothesis was not supported by the data.
Another research strategy examined the possibility of differential 
cerebral hemisphere processing of phonetic symbols. Although the 
experimental literature gives overwhelming evidence for left hemisphere 
superiority (in right-handers) for the performance of most language 
tasks, there is a body of research to suggest that the right hemisphere 
has a role in interpreting linguistic affect, metaphore and context 
(Filskov and Boll 1981; Gardner and Denes 1973). Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that the spatial/contextual/metaphorical cognitive propen­
sities of the right hemisphere would more readily grasp semantic a 
priori in the phonemes of human speech. This hypothesis was tested in 
two ways. One technique employed a visual gestalt closure task which
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had previously been used to diagnose right hemisphere damage. It was 
argued that superior performance on this task should imply excellent 
right hemisphere cognitive function. Although subjects in the present 
study showed a range of performance on the gestalt closure (Mooney) 
task, no significant correlation was found between visual gestalt 
performance and phonetic symbol decoding skill.
The other method used to examine right hemisphere phonetic symbol 
facility involved comparison of performance by visual field. It was 
predicted that phonetic symbol stimuli presented to the right hemisphere 
(via the left visual field) would be more readily decoded than stimuli 
presented to the left hemisphere. Consequently, it was hypothesized 
that the correlation between the number of total correct responses and 
the percentage of total correct responses registering in the right 
hemisphere would be significant and positive. The result that was 
obtained showed a significant and negative correlation between these 
variables. This result disconfirms the original hypothesis and also 
implicates the left hemisphere as the primary agent for decoding 
phonetic symbol stimuli.
Recent research on right hemisphere language may offer partial 
explanation for the result contrary to hypothesis. Zaidel and Peters 
(1981) discovered that commissurotomized subjects were able to use their 
right hemispheres to match pictures of things with homonymous names 
(e.g., flying bat and baseball bat) and also pictures of things with 
names that rhyme. However, these patients were unable to use their 
right hemispheres to name any of the items by pointing to the appropri­
ate name in print. In another experiment reported in the same article, 
Zaidel and Peters presented nonlinguistic printed words similar to
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those used in this dissertation and asked their commissurotomized sub­
jects to match those "words" which rhymed; again, the investigators 
restricted input to the right hemisphere. The subjects were unable to 
perform above chance level. Zaidel and Peters concluded that the right 
hemisphere is able to read ideographically, recognizing words directly 
without any intermediate phonetic recoding. Such ideographic reading 
is thought to be dependent on prior familiarity with the test words, 
which permits processing as a whole template and does not require the 
translation of grapheme to phoneme. Perhaps such translation is 
entirely out of the realm of the right hemisphere by virtue of the 
sequential nature of the task of reading unfamiliar words; linear and 
sequential processing are more typically associated with the left hemi­
sphere. In light of the findings obtained in the study cited above and 
in previous work by the same authors (Peters and Zaidel 1980; Zaidel 
1978), it would seem improbable for the visual mode to permit right 
hemisphere processing of phonetic symbols. It will be recalled that 
a visual half-field design was chosen to assure complete crossover of 
stimulus material at the optic chiasm. This was hoped to be an improve­
ment over a monaural stimulus presentation which had been used 
successfully in a study of the primitive latent meanings of common 
English words (Adair 1974). Although one achieves only 60 percent 
neural crossover using the monaural technique, it might be a preferable 
method of differential presentation of phonetic symbols, since it is 
free from the processing limitations inherent in printed material.
Future research on the relationship between laterality and phonetic 
universals should consider carefully the issue of channel of presenta­
tion.
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In addition to the experimental treatments relating to intuition 
and laterality, a third approach to the examination of instinctual 
cognition was pursued through use of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This 
investigation used Holt's (1970) manual, which provides a method for 
distinguishing between adaptive and uncontrolled regression. The 
results generated by this manipulation did not reach significance, but 
they did reveal a pattern of trends consistent with theoretical expec­
tation. Specifically, heightened expression of "raw" or uncontrolled 
primary process correlated with resistance to the apprehension of 
phonetic symbols; whereas, high levels of adaptive regression correlated 
with enhanced phonetic symbol performance. This is in keeping with the 
interpretation that mature use of primary process implies ease in 
providing structure for perceptual stimuli and also in accessing 
semantic a priori.
When the Rorschach is used as a research tool in this fashion it 
ceases to be a clinical instrument and becomes instead a means to 
measure skill in perceptual synthesis. In this role it is seen as 
having the potential to delineate deep cognitive structure that is 
actively constructed by the subject through the stimulus of an amor­
phous form. By supplying his or her own contours and gestalts, the 
subject achieves a kind of closure with varying degrees of success. It 
is an open question as to whether these perceptual skills are of the 
same cloth as those associated with access to linguistic/semantic a 
priori; the present results are inconclusive (p = .08).
The results relating to interpersonal sensitivity would seem to be 
inconsistent with much of what has been stated concerning the Rorschach 
data. Although there is a trend suggesting association between
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phonetic universals and controlled primary process on the Rorschach, it 
was the Mehrabian empathy test, which was chosen for its propensity for 
more primitive and contagious affect, that showed highly significant 
correlation with phonetic symbol skill. To the extent that this attri­
bute implies a loss of control over one's affect, this would seem to be 
antithetical to mature, adaptive regression. It is interesting to 
compare this result with that obtained using the Ekman faces task. The 
latter test, which was meant to provide an index of one's skill at 
interpreting emotion in facial expression, did not correlate with 
phonetic symbolism. In contrast to the Mehrabian, the Ekman test was 
thought to be a more detached and objective empathic function. Perhaps 
the Mehrabian captures a substantial portion of the high affective 
intensity necessary for generating instinct-laden percepts which may 
or may not be transformed to a socially appropriate expression.
Findings Unrelated to Hypotheses
The most prominent result of the present study does not relate to 
any of the original hypotheses; rather, it concerns the finding of pro­
nounced sex differences in phonetic symbol skill. Most categories of 
phonetic symbol skill correlated significantly with female gender.
It is possible to view this result in the context of reported sex 
differences in verbal ability favoring^ females. Research literature has 
tended to support the picture of differential cognitive abilities 
according to gender. More specifically, it has become generally 
accepted that males show superiority in the performance of spatial cog­
nitive tasks, while females are superior in verbal tasks (Maccoby and 
Jacklin 1974; Hutt 1972).
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Female advantage on verbal skills appears to be very broad-based 
and includes areas such as vocabulary usage, grammar, oral expression 
and punctuation. Enhanced performance relative to males begins in 
early childhood and continues through high school and possibly beyond 
(Sherman 1978). It is interesting to note that this enhanced overall 
verbal skill relative to males has been found among learning disabled 
as well as normal children (Idol-Maestos 1980). Differences favoring 
females have been found among Japanese children performing a task 
requiring the recognition of cursive and ideographic writing (Tanaka 
1977). Significant differences favoring females have also been noted 
among elementary school children on the Stroop Color Word Interference 
Test (Cohen and Fischer 1980).
It will be recalled that the Stroop test was prominent in Holt's 
(1960) research on the relationship between cognitive control and adap­
tive regression. He speculated that greater interference effects on 
the Stroop resulted from immature cognitive development, which, in 
turn, produced conflict when the subject was asked to suppress a 
reading response and produce a color naming response. Conflict was 
seen as occurring in immature subjects because mastery of the more 
sophisticated response (i.e., reading) had occurred much more recently 
than it had in the mature subjects. In addition, these presumably 
immature subjects had an unexpectedly low frequency of primary process 
in their Rorschach protocols; however, the experimenter made anecdotal 
mention of nervous laughter and squirming, suggesting extreme discom­
fort and suppression of primary process. Perhaps the recent sex 
difference findings of Cohen and Fischer are indicative of less 
susceptibility to conflict and greater cognitive flexibility in the
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performance of linguistic tasks. In this connection, it is also of 
relevance to recall that schizophrenics showed markedly poorer perform­
ance than normals on both the conventional and the phonetic symbol 
Stroop tests (Wapner and Krus 1960; Langer, Stein and Rosenberg 1969), 
suggesting less control over symbolic/cognitive function.
Sex differences have been reported for performance on a standard­
ized clerical test which requires the matching and correction of a list 
of names and addresses against an original (Andrew and Patterson 1959; 
Schneidler and Patterson 1942). Females show consistent superiority on 
this task starting at age five and continuing on through adulthood 
(Miele 1958). While this task has been described as a measure of 
perceptual speed (Hyde and Rosenberg 1980), it would seem appropriate 
in the context of the present study to speculate as to whether the 
clerical task also taps cognitive/semantic properties of test stimuli 
which reflect a deep structural predisposition to printed material. 
Certainly, the high correlation between female gender and phonetic 
symbol skill obtained in this investigation is consistent with such an 
interpretation.
The developmental literature revealing very early sex differences 
in verbal and spatial cognitive skills has raised the question whether 
these findings reflect actual differences in brain physiology according 
to gender. From clinical reports on patients suffering from aphasia, 
it has long been noted that females are more likely to suffer language 
loss from a rightsided stroke than are males; clinicians also noted 
that females tended overall to have better prognosis for recovery of 
language following a stroke (Heilman and Valenstein 1979). These 
reports led to the suspicion that females are less lateralized for
86
language function than males. Recent well controlled experiments using 
dichotic listening and visual split field techniques have supported the 
notion of bilateral language function in females (Lake and Bryden 1976; 
McKeever and Jackson 1979). Bradshaw and Gates (1978) go so far as to 
interpret their results to suggest "that in females right hemisphere 
space normally reserved for visuospatial processing may have been 
invaded by secondary speech mechanisms"; these authors claim that the 
mechanisms they propose are essentially lexical and are used to assist 
in processing difficult phonological or graphological material. If 
female neurophysiology does provide extra "space" for semantic and 
lexical processing of novel material, the present results could con­
ceivably be a product of this advantage.
The possibility that female brain structure might enhance the 
apprehension of phonetic universals offers new avenues for future 
research into the general question of semantic invariance. Certainly, 
planned comparisons of gender performance on phonetic symbol tasks 
would seem to be indicated in light of present findings. Future 
research should address some of the speculation raised by Bradshaw and 
Gates about a special female lexicon apparatus; effort should be made 
to specify its unique function. Although the present study offers no 
evidence for right hemisphere phonetic symbol graphological function, 
Bradshaw and Gates' work would suggest that further exploration of 
phonetic/orthographic linkage is in order. In this connection, it is 
apropos to note that researchers in linguistics have found evidence for 
cross-modal invariance between phonemic and orthographic structure; 
Koriat and Levy (1977) found that monolingual Hebrew speaking subjects 
were able to guess the meaning of Hindi characters at a level
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significantly above chance. While linguistic research has yet to 
address the issue of sex differences, cross-modal investigation of 
semantic invariance has been of prime interest to psycholinguists for 
decades. Phonetic symbolism research should perhaps be seen as a subset 
of this larger concern (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum 1957).
The findings of the present study showing correlations between 
female gender and phonetic symbol scores can be described as seren- 
dipidy. However, to the extent that these results are consistent with 
previous research on female linguistic superiority, one is inclined to 
regard them as supportive of phonetic universals. Stated in negative 
terms, one would expect to have seen no significant association of 
gender with phonetic symbol score in the absence of differential 
phonetic universals access.
Reviewing all of the reported results obtained in the present 
study, it would seem appropriate to recast some of the theoretical 
notions which maintained at the outset. Perhaps it is consistent with 
the data at hand to regard phonetic symbol access as a function of 
one's ability to impose perceptual and cognitive structure on stimuli 
that do not have immediate consensual agreement as to meaning. A 
phoneme, a grapheme or an amorphous pictorial form will call forth a 
structuring mechanism which does not appear to be connected to the 
instinctual side of a person but rather seems to be a property of one's 
cognitive flexibility and sophistication. Such a conceptualization 
alters the epistemological debate posed in the first section of this 
paper, in that the issue ceases to concern radical articulations of 
associationism and nativism but moves instead to an inquiry into the 
limits of dynamic semantic structuring across modalities.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The preceding investigation examined the phenomenon of phonetic 
symbolism. Broadly defined, phonetic symbolism is a nativist theoreti­
cal construct which holds that inherent meaning exists in the phonemes 
of human speech. Although the debate between nativist and association- 
ist positions regarding the origin of human speech dates to classical 
antiquity, actual scientific inquiry began in the 1920's in Germany 
with the work of Von Hornbostel (1924) and Usnadze (1924). Sapir did 
the first study in America in 1929, and he was the first to coin the 
term phonetic symbol in reference to presumed inherently meaningful 
speech sounds.
Since 1929, American research in this area has taken two different 
approaches. One research strategy involves the use of monolingual 
subjects who are asked to guess the meanings of words from an unfamil­
iar language; the other strategy makes use of unconventional word 
sounds to which subjects are asked to attribute meanings. The latter 
research approach was taken in the present study.
Although it has been reliably demonstrated that persons favor 
certain meaning associations to a given word sound (Kohler 1927, Davis 
1961), little work has been done to examine the perceptual or intra­
psychic parameters of this skill. Following from nativist theory, it 
was felt to be a reasonable assumption that the phonetic symbol would
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represent an archaic segment in the evolution of language. Conse­
quently, the present study proposed to test the hypothesis that access 
to phonetic/semantic universals is related to an individual's ability 
to appreciate his instinctual, primitive motivation. A variety of 
measutjps were employed to maximize the distinction between high and low 
access to instinctual, primary process thought. The results are sug­
gestive of only a marginal association between primary process and 
phonetic symbol skill; however, primitive interpersonal sensitivity was 
correlated with phonetic symbolism.
Although unexpected, a strong relationship between female gender 
and phonetic symbol apprehension was found. This was discussed within 
the context of previous research demonstrating female superiority on 
verbal tasks.
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MOONEY FACES ANSWER SHEET
MOONEY FACES ANSWER SHEET
(Correct Response Marked X)
NAME
The figures you are about to see are all human faces, and they are all 
right side up. The numbered items below refer to the numbers of the 
figures in the accompanying booklet.
Your task is to describe the face by placing an x next to the most cor­
rect word in each of the following categories: SEX (Male, Female); AGE 
(child, adult, aged); and DIRECTION LOOKING (e.g. left, right, up, down, 
etc.). Rate the direction looking according to your own perspective—  
your right or left, etc.— and not the perspective of the face in the 
picture.
If you are unable to see a figure within a few seconds, skip it and 
return to it later.
1. Sex: M 
_XF
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
right
X straight out
__UP
2. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
left 
__up
X right
3. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
down
_X_right
left
4. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
X lower right 
upper left
straight out
5. Sex: XM 
F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
_Xlef t 
right
down
6. Sex: M 
JLf
Age: X child 
adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
down 
X right
_left
7. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
X straight out 
__up
_left
8. Sex: M 
_XF
Age: child 
adult
X aged Direction
Looking:
down
left
X right
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9. Sex: M 
X F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
upper 
X lower
right
left
lower right
10. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
up
_left
_X_right
11. Sex: M 
XF
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
down
left
_X_right
12. Sex: XM 
__F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
right 
_left
X down
13. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
X lower 
upper
left
left
upper right
14. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
up
_X_lef t
__right
15. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
right 
__left
X straight 
out
16. Sex: M 
_X_F
Age: X child 
adult
aged Direction
Looking:
lower
lower
left
right
X straight 
out
17. Sex: M 
_X_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
lower
_X_left
right __up
18. Sex: M 
_X_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
X upper 
lower
right
left
lower right
19. Sex: M 
_XF
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
upper
lower
left
right
X upper right
20. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
right 
X left
down
21. Sex: XM 
F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
_left
__up
X straight 
out
22. Sex: XM 
_F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction
Looking:
X left 
__up
right
23. Sex: XM 
F
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
down 
__right
_X_left
24. Sex: M 
_XF
Age: child 
X adult
aged Direction 
Looking:
lower 
X lower
left
right
upper left
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EKMAN FACES ANSWER SHEET
(Correct Response Marked i t)
DIRECTIONS:
Each of the numbered items below corresponds to a numbered picture of 
a human face in the accompanying booklet. The person in each of the 
pictures is exhibiting a particular emotion or blend of two emotions. 
For each item, circle the emotion that you think best describes the 
emotion being exhibited in the picture. Blends are indicated by two 
emotions with a slash between them (e.g. surprise/anger).
1. it a. fear b. surprise c. sadness d. happiness
2. a. surprise b. disgust #c. happiness d. slight
happines:
3. a. neutral b. happiness #c. contempt d. sadness
4. a. disgust #b. fear c. surprise d. sadness
5. it a . sadness b. contempt c. shock d. disgust
6. a. disgust b. surprise/
anger
c. contempt #d. anger
7. a. anger/fear #b. fear c. disgust d. happiness
8. //a. neutral b. fear c. contempt d. sadness
9. a. surprise #b. surprise/
fear
c. surprise/
disgust
d. surprise/
anger
10. a. disgust b. neutral c. anger #d. sadness
11. a. happiness b. neutral c. contempt i t d . happiness
contempt
12. a. sadness b. anger/
surprise
#c. anger d. contempt/
anger
13. i t a . surprise/
fear
b. surprise/
anger
c. surprise/
disgust
d. surprise
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14. a. anger b. fear #c. disgust d. contempt
15. a. disgust #b. disgust/
contempt
c. surprise/
disgust
d. sadness
16. #a. sadness b. fear c. surprise/
fear
d. happiness
17. a. contempt b. surprise/
disgust
c. sadness #d. disgust
18. a. anger/
surprise
b. disgust y/c. anger/
disgust
d. surprise/
disgust
19. //a. sadness b. happiness c. sadness/
fear
d. sadness/
contempt
20. a. surprise/
disgust
b. anger/
fear
c. surprise #d. anger/
surprise
21. a. contempt #b. happiness c. fear d. fear/
happiness
22. a. contempt b. disgust #c. anger d. anger/
sadness
23. a. fear b. contempt c. natural #d. sadness
24. //a. disgust/
contempt
b. sadness/fear' c. anger/
disgust
d. surprise
25. #a. fear b. surprise c. sadness d. horror
26. a. contempt #b. neutral c. slight
sadness
d. slight
fear
27. a. surprise/
happiness
b.
•
surprise/
disgust
#c. surprise/
fear
d. surprise/
anger
28. #a. surprise/
fear
b. surprise c. fear d. sadness
29. a. disgust/ 
anger
b. surprise/
anger
c. surprise #d. anger
30. a. surprise/
happiness
#b. surprise c. surprise/
fear
d. anger
31. #a. disgust/
anger
b. anger c. contempt d. sadness
32. a. horror b. skepticism #c. surprise d. fear
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33. a. happiness b. anger/
surprise
//c. anger d. anger/
contempt
34. a. disgust #b. surprise c. surprise/
sadness
d. fear
35. #a. disgust b. anger c. fear d. happiness
36. a. contempt #b. fear c. disgust d. fear/
sadness
37. a. sadness #b. fear c. happiness d. surprise
38. a. surprise #b. happiness c. disgust d. relief
39. a. surprise b. happiness/
surprise
# c. fear/
surprise
d. sadness/
surprise
40. #a. anger/
disgust
b. anger/
sadness
c. anger/
surprise
d. anger
41. a. contempt b. fear c. joy #d. anger
42. a. contempt b. relief #c. happiness d. anger
43. a. fear b. surprise/
happiness
c. relief/
happiness
# d. happiness
44. a. anger/
contempt
# b. anger c. anger/
disgust
d. fury
45. a. anger #b. happiness c. sadness d. surprise
46. a. anger b. happiness # c. sadness d. fear
47. #a. fear b. surprise/
fear
c. sadness/
fear
d. pleasure
48. a. contempt b. surprise c. happiness #d. neutral
49. a. happiness b. neutral #c. sadness d. disgust
50. a. happiness #b. happiness/
surprise
c. surprise/
fear
d. contempt
51. a. happiness #b. fear c. anger d. neutral
52. a. contempt #b. disgust c. anger d. fear
53. a. neutral b. fear #c. surprise d. anger
54. //a. surprise b. fear c. surprise/
fear
d. anger
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55. it a . surprise/
happiness
b. neutral
56. it a. contempt b. neutral
57. a. anger/
sadness
b. anger/
fear
58. it a . slight
sadness
b. extreme
sadness
59. it a . anger/
disgust
b. anger
60. a. sadness i t b . sadness/
fear
c. surprise/
fear
d. surprise
c. sadness d. fear
#c. anger/
contempt
d. anger/
happiness
c. slight
fear
d. extreme
fear
c. anger/
happiness
d. anger/
surprise
c. anger d. surprise
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EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE
EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE
(+ Marks Direction of Maximum Score)
NAME
DIRECTIONS: Answer each of the following questions by placing an x on 
the part of the scale which most closely corresponds to 
your agreement (or disagreement) with that item. The 
scale has eight segments, ranging from "very strongly 
agree" to "very strongly disagree."
Example:
A. I like rare roast beef
/ / x /
very 
strongly 
agree
/ / / / / /
mildly mildly very
agree disagree strongly
disagree
1. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very
strongly
agree
mildly mildly 
agree disagree
very
strongly
disagree
2. People make too much of the feelings and sensitivity of animals.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very
strongly
agree
mildly mildly 
agree disagree
very
strongly
disagree
3. I often find public displays of affection annoying.
/ / / t i l l / /+
very
strongly
agree
mildly mildly 
agree disagree
very
strongly
disagree
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4. I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just sorry for themselves.
/ / / / / / / / / +
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
5. I become nervous if others around ime seem to be nervous.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
6. I f  ind it silly for people to cry <out of happiness.
/ / / / / / / / / +
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
7. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
8. Sometimes the ■words of a love song can move me deeply.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
9. I tend to lose control when I am bringing bad news to people.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
10. The people around me have a great :influence on my moods.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
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11. Most foreigners I have met seemed
I I  I I  !
cool and unemotional.
/ / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job training
center •
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
13. I don' t get upset just because a friend is acting upset.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
14. I like to watch people open presents.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
16. Seeing people cry upsets me.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
17. Some songs make me happy.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
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18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a 
novel.
+/ / / / / / / /
19.
20.
21.
24.
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
I get very angry when I see someone being :ill-treated.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
I am able to remain calm even though those around me worry.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
When a friend starts to talk about his problems, I: try to steer
the conversation to something else.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
Another's laughter is not catching for me.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the amount of crying and
sniffling around me.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
I am able to make decisions without being :influenced by people's
feelings.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
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25. I cannot continue to feel OK if people around me are depressed.
+/ / / t i l l / /
very
strongly
agree
mildly mildly 
agree disagree
very
strongly
disagree
26. It is hard for me to see how some things upset people so much.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very
strongly
agree
mildly mildly 
agree disagree
very
strongly
disagree
27. I am very upset when I see an animal in pain.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
Becoming involved in books or movies is a little silly.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very
strongly
agree
mildly
agree
mildly
disagree
very
strongly
disagree
29. It upsets; me to see helpless old people.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very
strongly
agree
mildly
agree
mildly
disagree
very
strongly
disagree
30. I become 
tears.
more irritated than sympathetic when I see someone's
/ / / / / / / / /+
very
strongly
agree
mildly
agree
mildly
disagree
very
strongly
disagree
31. I become very involved when I watch a movie.
+/ / / / / / / / /
very
strongly
agree
mildly
agree
mildly
disagree
very
strongly
disagree
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32. I often find that I can remain cool in spite of the excitement 
around me.
/ / / / / / / / / +
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
33. Little children sometimes cry for no apparent reason.
/ / / / / / / / /+
very mildly mildly very
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
You are about to participate in an experiment on word meanings.
For this experiment you will be asked to assign meanings to nonwords. 
These nonwords are pronounceable sounds which consist of between two 
and six letters. You will be viewing them through the table viewer 
in front of you. Look through the eyepiece of the viewer, and you will 
see an "X" in the center of the viewing field. Do you see this? On 
each trial, I will ask you to fix your gaze on the "X" when I give the 
signal, "ready." Shortly following the signal a nonword will appear 
on the left or the right of your viewing field. When you see this 
nonword (or word-sound) you are to associate one of three colors with 
it— red, blue or green. Think only of those three— green, red or 
blue. After you choose one of these colors, announce it loudly in the 
microphone in front of you. Your response will stop a timer con­
nected to the apparatus, and we will then start another trial.
Remember, choose only from the colors blue, green or red. Do you 
have any questions?
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APPENDIX G
LIST OF STIMULUS ITEMS
LIST OF STIMULUS ITEMS
Target Items Listed With High Frequency Color Associate
NERD —  green SLE
DING 
SOOS 
HAF -- red
TUR —  green
ETH
DER
IK
MU — blue
SKAF —  red 
KOF
ZAH -- red OOM —  blue
LUM -- blue ISH —  green
TOD -- red ZING
SOOL —  blue MUMLE —  blue
ITE
ELBE
KLAK —  red
COM —  blue 
SKRINT
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